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(单词翻译:双击或拖选)
Mexico's growing crisis
Reforms and democracy, but no rule of law
To save a promising1 presidency2, Enrique Peaa Nieto must tackle crime and corruption4
DURING two years in office Mexico's president, Enrique Peaa Nieto, has received sharply contrasting reviews at home and abroad. Foreigners, including The Economist5, have praised his structural6 reforms of the economy, which include an historic measure to open up energy to private investment. Yet polls show that most Mexicans dislike Mr Peaa. Among other things, they blame his government for a squeeze on living standards and the interlinked problems of violent crime and corruption. Sadly, recent events have lent support to Mr Peaa's domestic critics.
On November 8th Mexico's attorney-general announced what almost everyone had already concluded: that 43 students from a teacher-training college in the southern state of Guerrero, who disappeared in the town of Iguala in late September, had been murdered by drug-traffickers after being kidnapped by the local police on the orders of the town's mayor. Guerrero has been Mexico's most violent state for centuries. The federal government bears no direct responsibility for these events. But Mexicans see in them a symbol of the failure of Mr Peaa's administration to make security a priority.
Now comes a problem that is uncomfortably close to home. The government had already opted7 to cancel a contract for a high-speed train that it had hastily awarded to the sole bidder8, a consortium of Chinese and Mexican companies including a construction firm from the president's home state. A local journalist has revealed that the boss of the same firm owns a mansion9 that is the Peaa family's private residence. The president denies any wrongdoing, but a common thread runs through these events.
Mexico only became a democracy in 2000, when seven decades of rule by the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), the political machine that raised Mr Peaa, were ended by electoral defeat. Unfortunately, democracy did not bring the rule of law to Mexico. Too many in the PRI still see the job of the police and the courts as enforcing political control, rather than investigating mobsters. Corrupt3 politicians are protected rather than punished. Organised crime and graft10 both remain a part of everyday life, and neither has been helped by the drugs flowing north to the United States.
Some things have changed. The Supreme11 Court now operates professionally. A 41,000-strong federal police force is more capable than most of its local counterparts. Felipe Calderón, Mr Peaa's predecessor12, weakened the drugs gangs, but at the price of a surging murder rate and unchecked abuses by the security forces. On paper, Mr Peaa has a grand crime-prevention strategy. However his real efforts have been focused on the economy. The murder rate may have fallen back slightly, but extortion and kidnappings have not. Tycoons13 practise espionage14 and bribe15 judges. For many Mexicans, Iguala was a reminder16 of the gap between justice for the poor and for the rich.
Mr Peaa's people rightly say that the rule of law cannot be imposed in Mexico overnight. But that is no excuse for inaction today. Iguala is not the only town where criminals run the police: in such places, the federal government should take temporary control of the police and administration. Mr Peaa should lead an effort to clean up state police forces and local courts. A bill to make the attorney-general's office independent and to create an anti-corruption agency should be fast-tracked. Federalism in Mexico needs change, too: states and municipalities raise almost no funds of their own and are not held to account for their spending. It is an indictment18 of all three main political parties that the elements in Mr Peaa's reform pact19 to make politicians accountable have yet to be approved.
However impressive Mr Peaa's economic reforms, Mexico will never manage to achieve its considerable potential without an honest, efficient criminal-justice system. Its democracy will lose legitimacy20 if its politicians continue to tolerate graft. Mr Peaa's domestic critics say that he is a skin-deep moderniser, steeped in his party's bad old ways. Now is the time for him to prove them wrong.
1 promising | |
adj.有希望的,有前途的 | |
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2 presidency | |
n.总统(校长,总经理)的职位(任期) | |
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3 corrupt | |
v.贿赂,收买;adj.腐败的,贪污的 | |
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4 corruption | |
n.腐败,堕落,贪污 | |
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5 economist | |
n.经济学家,经济专家,节俭的人 | |
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6 structural | |
adj.构造的,组织的,建筑(用)的 | |
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7 opted | |
v.选择,挑选( opt的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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8 bidder | |
n.(拍卖时的)出价人,报价人,投标人 | |
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9 mansion | |
n.大厦,大楼;宅第 | |
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10 graft | |
n.移植,嫁接,艰苦工作,贪污;v.移植,嫁接 | |
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11 supreme | |
adj.极度的,最重要的;至高的,最高的 | |
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12 predecessor | |
n.前辈,前任 | |
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13 tycoons | |
大君( tycoon的名词复数 ); 将军; 企业巨头; 大亨 | |
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14 espionage | |
n.间谍行为,谍报活动 | |
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15 bribe | |
n.贿赂;v.向…行贿,买通 | |
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16 reminder | |
n.提醒物,纪念品;暗示,提示 | |
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17 impunity | |
n.(惩罚、损失、伤害等的)免除 | |
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18 indictment | |
n.起诉;诉状 | |
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19 pact | |
n.合同,条约,公约,协定 | |
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20 legitimacy | |
n.合法,正当 | |
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