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(单词翻译:双击或拖选)
Shelby Pierson: Threats To 2020 Election May Now Be 'Broader
NOEL KING, HOST:
Will the 2020 elections be secure from interference either foreign or domestic? Yesterday, I asked Shelby Pierson. She is the first ever intelligence community election threats executive. She was appointed by then-Director of National Intelligence Dan Coats in July of 2019. Her job is to work with intelligence agencies like the CIA, the FBI, the NSA and the Department of Homeland Security to identify and fight actors that are trying to interfere1 with our voting process.
SHELBY PIERSON: The Russians, for example, are already engaging in influence operations relative to candidates going into 2020. But we do not have evidence at this time that our adversaries2 are directly looking at interfering3 with vote counts or the vote tallies4.
KING: Is it fair to say we don't know what Russia is going to do yet?
PIERSON: I think that is a fair characterization. And I would also say that this isn't a Russia-only problem. We're still also concerned about China, Iran, non-state actors, hacktivists and frankly5 - certainly for DHS and FBI - even Americans that might be looking to undermine confidence in the elections.
KING: After Russia interfered6 in the 2016 election, there was this push for transparency about attempts to influence our elections. Pierson told me she's walking a line between not wanting to frighten people, but also wanting to keep them informed.
PIERSON: Transparency enables resilience. And sunlight is the best disinfectant. So the more that we talk about the threat, potentially more we empower voters to understand this as merely a reality of today's landscape - and that despite all of those challenges, we're managing them or countering them. And they should vote.
KING: You are constantly doing the calculus7 on this...
PIERSON: Absolutely.
KING: ...You are constantly trying to figure out, is it worth saying it now? Is it worth waiting and seeing how much of a threat it is?
PIERSON: Absolutely.
KING: Would you say that's a daily occurrence?
PIERSON: The challenge for us is that for anyone who has any tenure8 in the intelligence community, we're in the business of threats...
KING: Sure. Sure.
PIERSON: ...So we're seeing information day in and day out. And I think the challenge is, to your point, when does that mature enough to the point where it's either actionable, where the target can take meaningful countermeasures so that it is stopped in its tracks, so to speak - all the way to are we going to reveal this because it'll help raise awareness9 and sensitize people?
KING: This sounds like a very difficult balancing act. The U.S. intelligence community agrees that Russia interfered in the 2016 election to benefit President Trump10 and hurt Hillary Clinton. President Trump has openly joked about Russia interfering in the 2016 election. In fact, he appeared to joke with Vladimir Putin about it. At times, he doesn't appear to take this threat seriously. That has to make your job harder.
PIERSON: We are looking at the spectrum11 of information that comes into us day in and day out to enable all the missions. And that can continue, frankly, unencumbered by any of the comments or political discourse12 that you hear globally about this topic. I will say that the intelligence community has the authorities it needs. It has the resources it needs. And when we have needed the president to relay warnings - for example, most recently to Mr. Lavrov in Russia - he has done so.
KING: Sergey Lavrov?
PIERSON: Yes.
KING: Would you just explain what you mean there, if you would?
PIERSON: Sure. I think the interagency process, not just the intelligence community, has strongly encouraged leaders - whether that includes President Trump or Secretary of State Pompeo or Secretary of Defense13 Mr. Esper - to relay information to our international colleagues that interfering in the U.S. elections is unacceptable to the United States. And that type of messaging is very important in terms of ensuring the global cognizance that this is activity that will not be tolerated in any way, shape or form.
KING: You don't feel yourself having to work around President Trump?
PIERSON: Not at all.
KING: Here are some things that we're learning now. Last week, a private American company, Area 1 Security, reported that it had discovered that Russia had successfully compromised a Ukrainian energy conglomerate14, which includes Burisma, the company at the center of the impeachment15.
This is a private company saying it detected interference in Ukraine, which could indicate interference in the U.S. election. The method by which Russia interfered with this conglomerate was the same thing that they did in 2016 to us. Why was it not the U.S. government that told us about what happened, about Russia hacking16 Burisma?
PIERSON: I think this is a really important point, because frankly there is a whole consortium of players in this landscape, which include private security firms and, in fact, not just international infrastructure17 organizations like Burisma, but frankly even some of our state and local elections. Their cybersecurity comes from private security firms. So those organizations will actually have deeper and technical insight into those networks before the intelligence community will.
KING: These private companies, do they share information with the U.S. intelligence community?
PIERSON: Well, I think many of these firms, particularly larger ones, will sell reports based upon the information that they have access to. And some of that's very important to complement18 the holdings that we have in the intelligence community.
KING: Are you saying those private security companies are also selling intelligence to the United States government?
PIERSON: Yes. They can sell their services. And some of the most common firms - FireEye and CrowdStrike. And, in fact, I think those two firms, for example, have done really good work where, based upon the analysis and expertise19 and information analysis that they do resident within those firms, those are products and services that they can sell to the U.S. government.
KING: I am surprised to hear that private companies are selling information to the U.S. intelligence community, information that the U.S. intelligence community itself does not have. Am I being naive20?
PIERSON: Well, it's not necessarily naivete. I think it really needs to be an open discussion about, why is the landscape the way it is? And frankly, I think many Americans might have concerns about the U.S. federal government or Big Brother having technical access to a full spectrum of networks. I think there really needs to be an open debate about that before people presume that the intelligence community should have a presence on everyone's network.
KING: Do you see that debate happening?
PIERSON: I think it's one that's burgeoning21, certainly, because sometimes, Noel, I feel that the intelligence community is held accountable for a lot of information that it's not necessarily - doesn't have access to or isn't part of its mission and purview22.
KING: We know that Americans are spreading misinformation. Sometimes they're doing it deliberately23, sometimes they're not at all doing it deliberately. It can be a post on social media that we don't know is fake. Is that a bigger threat to the election than foreign interference?
PIERSON: Well, I think there's two aspects of that. You know, let's be very clear that of course the federal government encourages and wants as broad and free speech as possible. That is a principle of our country, and it's probably one of the most valuable cornerstones of our society. So we want people to engage in public exchange, political exchange and to have that freedom unfettered from foreign interference.
But at the same time, I think we also want to make sure that if we or the firms involved are aware that this information is foreign-sponsored and is covert24 in terms of its sponsorship to the user, we want to do everything we can to manage that information.
KING: You say that the American public needs to be cognizant that misinformation is out there. We also know that Americans increasingly live in very partisan25 spaces, that much of the media that they are looking at takes one position or another. Is there anything at all that you can do to deal with the fact that, more than ever, we are a bifurcated26 nation, we are people who believe different things?
PIERSON: I would ask that all press outlets27 be introspective about their role, frankly, in civil society in terms of journalistic ethics28 and where they fit into providing nonpartisan information, factually-based information. And I think that's part of this issue that the intelligence community doesn't necessarily have a direct role in this, but I think we're trying to raise cognizance and awareness across all of these constituencies that we all, frankly, have a role, in a variety of capacities, in countering this threat.
KING: What about the president of the United States making false or misleading statements?
PIERSON: Well, I think the challenge is whether or not that's being promulgated29 or deliberately fomented30 by a foreign intelligence service or a foreign government. And I think that's the type of information that if we have holdings within the intelligence community, we're going to certainly look to share that information as broadly as needed to stop it.
KING: It sounds like what you're saying is if the president says something false, other countries can use that to their advantage.
PIERSON: I think the challenge for us is not necessarily the accuracy of an individual statement, but as I mentioned, this issue of whether or not an intelligence service, a foreign government is using it for manipulative purposes, particularly purposes that are covert, here in the United States. And that's where we want to step in.
KING: Shelby Pierson, intelligence community election threats executive. Ms. Pierson, thank you so much for coming in.
PIERSON: Thank you for having me.
1 interfere | |
v.(in)干涉,干预;(with)妨碍,打扰 | |
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2 adversaries | |
n.对手,敌手( adversary的名词复数 ) | |
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3 interfering | |
adj. 妨碍的 动词interfere的现在分词 | |
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4 tallies | |
n.账( tally的名词复数 );符合;(计数的)签;标签v.计算,清点( tally的第三人称单数 );加标签(或标记)于;(使)符合;(使)吻合 | |
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5 frankly | |
adv.坦白地,直率地;坦率地说 | |
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6 interfered | |
v.干预( interfere的过去式和过去分词 );调停;妨碍;干涉 | |
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7 calculus | |
n.微积分;结石 | |
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8 tenure | |
n.终身职位;任期;(土地)保有权,保有期 | |
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9 awareness | |
n.意识,觉悟,懂事,明智 | |
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10 trump | |
n.王牌,法宝;v.打出王牌,吹喇叭 | |
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11 spectrum | |
n.谱,光谱,频谱;范围,幅度,系列 | |
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12 discourse | |
n.论文,演说;谈话;话语;vi.讲述,著述 | |
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13 defense | |
n.防御,保卫;[pl.]防务工事;辩护,答辩 | |
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14 conglomerate | |
n.综合商社,多元化集团公司 | |
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15 impeachment | |
n.弹劾;控告;怀疑 | |
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16 hacking | |
n.非法访问计算机系统和数据库的活动 | |
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17 infrastructure | |
n.下部构造,下部组织,基础结构,基础设施 | |
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18 complement | |
n.补足物,船上的定员;补语;vt.补充,补足 | |
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19 expertise | |
n.专门知识(或技能等),专长 | |
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20 naive | |
adj.幼稚的,轻信的;天真的 | |
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21 burgeoning | |
adj.迅速成长的,迅速发展的v.发芽,抽枝( burgeon的现在分词 );迅速发展;发(芽),抽(枝) | |
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22 purview | |
n.范围;眼界 | |
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23 deliberately | |
adv.审慎地;蓄意地;故意地 | |
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24 covert | |
adj.隐藏的;暗地里的 | |
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25 partisan | |
adj.党派性的;游击队的;n.游击队员;党徒 | |
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26 bifurcated | |
a.分为两部分 | |
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27 outlets | |
n.出口( outlet的名词复数 );经销店;插座;廉价经销店 | |
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28 ethics | |
n.伦理学;伦理观,道德标准 | |
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29 promulgated | |
v.宣扬(某事物)( promulgate的过去式和过去分词 );传播;公布;颁布(法令、新法律等) | |
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30 fomented | |
v.激起,煽动(麻烦等)( foment的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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