外交政策

　　Home alone

　　独守本土

　　As China rises, must Australia tremble?

　　当中国崛起时，澳大利亚必将战栗？

　　May 26th 2011 | from the print edition

　　BACK IN THE days of the tyranny of distance, the primal terror of Australians was the fear of abandonment. During the country’s first few decades it looked for its security to Britain, a friendly but far-off power. After Singapore fell to the Japanese in 1942, Britain abandoned its former colony. Fortunately, America took its place and has been guaranteeing Australia’s security ever since. Even so, Australia is once again feeling nervous about finding itself alone, prompted by three changes. The first is the growing economic power of China, followed closely by its growing political and military power. The second is that America’s role as the single pole of a unipolar world is inevitably coming to an end. And third, Australia’s new pattern of trade means that for the first time its main commercial partner, China, is not a strategic ally. None of this involves an immediate threat to Australians, but it makes life more complicated.

　　在世界还被距离所主宰的时代，澳大利亚人最大的恐惧莫过于遭到抛弃。在该国成立之初的几十年中，澳大利亚仰仗友好却遥远的强国——英国为其提供安全保障。当新加坡于1942年被日本人攻陷之后，英国抛弃了这片先前的殖民地。幸好，美国接了英国的位置，并在此后一直保障着澳大利亚的安全。即便如此，由于三方面变化所致，澳大利亚还是再一次为发觉自己孤立无援而忧心忡忡。第一种变化是中国正在增强的经济实力，以及该国紧随经济实力增长而增长的政治与军事实力。第二种变化在于，美国所扮演的单极世界中唯一一极的角色正在不可避免地走向终结。第三种变化则是，澳大利亚新的贸易格局意味着出现了前所未有的情况，即该国主要的商业伙伴——中国，并不是自己的战略盟友。对于澳大利亚人而言，所有这一切并没有包含迫在眉睫的威胁，但它却使生活变得更加复杂。

　　Not yet on their doorstep. For years Australia was neurotically concerned about Indonesia, a huge neighbour that has sometimes looked violent or unstable but now seems benign, democratic and rather successful. Smaller neighbours, however, are more worrying. In Papua New Guinea, for example, administered by Australia from 1906 to 1973, many of the social indicators are heading down and it is becoming increasingly violent. Some of the tiny island states that speckle the map of the Pacific also make uncomfortable neighbours. Fiji has coups, the Solomons has scandals, and almost all have struggling economies. Since poverty and size make them potentially easy to influence, they need care and attention.

　　不过威胁尚未兵临城下。多年来，澳大利亚对于印度尼西亚抱有一种神经质般的担忧，印尼是一个曾经时而看似狂暴或不稳定的庞大邻邦，但该国如今看起来既温和又民主，而且相当成功。不过，规模较小的邻国则更加令人担心。例如在1906年至1973年间由澳大利亚管理的巴布亚新几内亚，该国许多社会指标正在下滑，暴力色彩也日趋浓重。散布于太平洋版图上的狭小岛国中，也有一些变成了令人不安的邻居。斐济发生政变，所罗门群岛出现丑闻，而且这些国家的经济形势几乎都是举步维艰。贫困和狭小使得它们在潜在层面上易于受到影响，因此这些国家需要得到关照和注意。

　　The wider region is the larger worry, partly because it encompasses so many poor, autocratic or unstable countries, partly because Australia does not fit in very comfortably. It has never really tried to pass itself off as an Asian country, nor been accepted as such. Instead, it has made itself seem less out of place by joining, and sometimes helping to create, various regional groups. Many of these are fine as far as they go, but some accept too many nasty members (such as Myanmar) to allow useful agreement, and even the more discriminating clubs have their tensions. Mr Rudd, as prime minister, worked hard to promote the creation of an Asia-Pacific Community in which everything from security, trade and terrorism to energy, disease and natural disasters would be discussed, filling a large gap in the other arrangements. It may prove useful if it comes off.

　　部分是因为更广阔的地区包含着那么多贫困、独裁或不稳定的国家，部分是由于澳大利亚并没有舒舒服服地融入其中，因此这片区域更令澳大利亚感到担忧。澳大利亚从未真正试图扮作一个亚洲国家，也从来没有被接受为一个亚洲国家。该国转而通过加入（以及有时帮助创建）各种类型的地区集团，以使自己在这片区域内看上去并没有那么格格不入。此类集团中有许多就目前的发展而言还算不错，不过有些集团却因为接纳了太多可憎的成员（如缅甸），而无法产生有用的协定，而且即便是那些挑选成员时更加注意区分的集团，也存在着自己的紧张局面。陆克文在担任澳大利亚总理时，曾努力推动亚太共同体的创建，在这一组织中，各方可以对从安全、贸易及恐怖主义，到能源、疾病及自然灾害等所有议题展开讨论，它将填补其他安排所留下的大片空白。如果该集团能够成功建立，它或许将被证明大有裨益。

　　The political task, though, has to some extent been taken over by the G20, in whose creation Mr Rudd played a role, helping to ensure that it was not confined to just 14 countries. This is the natural forum for a middle-ranking power, such as Australia, with global as well as regional interests. Australia, remember, has sent its troops to fight in wars from South Africa to Vietnam. Nowadays they go to Iraq and Afghanistan. It is clearly right that it should have a place among democracies of a certain economic weight, such as Canada, Mexico, South Korea and Turkey.

　　不过，这一政治任务却在某种程度上已被二十国集团接手承担，陆克文在后者的创建中也发挥了作用，他帮助确保该组织并不仅限于14个国家。对于类似澳大利亚这样一个既具有地区利益，也拥有全球利益的中等强国而言，二十国集团是一个天然论坛。请记住一点：从南非到越南，澳大利亚都曾出兵参战，如今，澳军则前往伊拉克和阿富汗作战。澳大利亚应当在诸如加拿大、墨西哥、韩国以及土耳其等具有一定经济分量的民主国家中占据一席之地，这一点显然并无不当之处。

　　Where Oz still counts

　　澳洲依旧重要之处

　　In truth, Australia is a bigger power than it sometimes believes. Out of the world’s 193 sovereign states, it ranks sixth in land area, 13th in economic production, 14th in defence spending and 50th in population. It will be overtaken in some of these categories because its population will stay relatively small, but for the time being it still carries some weight.

　　事实上，澳大利亚是一个比它自己有时所相信的更大的强国。在全球193个主权国家中，该国的国土面积排名第6位，经济产出排名第13位，国防开支排名第14位，人口排名第50位。由于该国人口规模将保持在相对较小的水平上，因此在这其中的某些类别上，澳大利亚将被其他国家赶超，但眼下该国仍然具有一定的分量。

　　That is already apparent in its foreign-aid budget, which the Howard government doubled and the current government says it will double again, bringing it to 0.5% of GDP by 2015. And no longer will most of it be spent regionally; in future it will be a global programme. But America may also make increased demands on Australia that will call for higher spending on defence.

　　这一点在澳大利亚的对外援助预算中已经一目了然，霍华德政府将这一预算提高了一倍，而现任政府表示预算规模将再度翻番，到2015年时将其提升至GDP的0.5%。而且这一预算将不再大部分用于局部地区之内；未来，这将会是一个全球计划。不过，美国或许也会对澳大利亚提出更多的需求，这将要求后者增加国防开支。

　　The reason, of course, will be China, which has become a pushy maritime power. Its actions, including the commissioning this year of its first aircraft-carrier, make that plain. Less clear is whether it will want to challenge the United States at some point for maritime primacy in and around the Pacific. Some pessimists see that as inevitable for a world power in the making. More optimistic analysts think China will stay preoccupied with economic development at home for at least two or three decades. Both groups agree, however, that a problem, if mishandled, could escalate, just as it did in 1995-96, when China was “testing” missiles and America sailed a carrier battle-group through the Taiwan Strait.

　　中国当然将是其原因之所在，该国已经成为了一个咄咄逼人的海上强国。包括今年第一艘航空母舰服役在内，中国的行为使得这一点得到了清楚的体现。尚没有此般清晰的则是：中国是否将会在某一时刻，希望为夺取太平洋及其周边海域的海上主导地位而向美国发起挑战。在某些悲观人士看来，对于一个正在形成中的世界强国而言，这一局面将不可避免。而更为乐观的分析家则认为：中国在未来至少二三十年时间内，仍会继续全神贯注于本国的经济发展。不过，双方都同意一点：如果一个问题处置失当，则有可能升级，这就像1995年至1996年间的情况一样，当时中国“试射”导弹，而美国派遣航母战斗群穿越台湾海峡。

　　Australia, for its part, has to make guesses about America’s future behaviour as well as China’s. Hugh White, professor of strategic studies at Australian National University, believes that, faced with China’s growing power, America can either withdraw from Asia, share power with China or compete for primacy. He worries about America’s resoluteness in a long competition with China, already sees a “drift to antagonism” and fears it could lead to a war that might turn nuclear. For Australia, he thinks, the best outcome would be for America to relinquish primacy and share power with China and other countries in a “concert of Asia”.

　　对于澳大利亚而言，它必须猜测美国以及中国在未来的行为。澳大利亚国立大学的战略研究教授休?怀特(Hugh White)相信，面对中国正在增长的实力，美国可以或者撤出亚洲，与中国分享权力，或者与中国争夺主导地位。怀特对于美国在与中国展开长期竞争一事上的坚毅态度感到担忧，他已觉察到一种“向着敌对状况的滑动”，并担心这可能会导致一场将向核战争方向转化的战争。修特认为对澳大利亚而言，最好的结果将是美国放弃主导地位，在“亚洲协调”体系下与中国以及其他国家分享权力。

　　Mr White’s thesis, put forward in a recent issue of Quarterly Essay, has caused some debate in Australia, but few people there see the United States wanting to carve up Asia with China. Rather, they say, the signs are that it will simply re-engage and compete. The hope is that China’s main military aim is to have control of the waters round its coasts, and thus to keep other countries away from its maritime borders. So long as that does not involve directly challenging America for primacy, both countries can continue to compete and co-operate.

　　怀特在近期的《季评》(Quarterly Essay)上提出的论点，已经在澳大利亚引发了一定的争论，不过该国并没有多少人认为美国希望与中国瓜分亚洲，他们转而提出：迹象表明美国将只会再度与中国进行接触并与之竞争。人们所希望的是，中国的主要军事目标是获得对其海岸附近水域的控制权，并因此将其他国家阻挡在该国海洋边界之外。只要这不涉及为争夺主导权而向美国发起直接挑战，中美两国就能继续进行竞争与合作。

　　Remember the Dardanelles

　　记住达达尼尔战役

　　America is popular in Australia, and vice versa. When Ms Gillard delivered a glutinous speech to a joint session of Congress in March, she got six standing ovations. No big changes seem likely, but Australia is rich these days and America is feeling poor. It may be asking the Aussies for help before long, perhaps even suggesting it should place some forces alongside America’s in somewhere like Guam, from which Uncle Sam can show who’s boss in the Pacific. Australia might not welcome this: it wants to be friends with both big powers.

　　美国在澳大利亚广受欢迎，而后者同样在美国深得人心。当吉拉德在3月份向美国国会两院联席会议发表一篇粘稠腻人的演讲时，听众曾六次为她起立鼓掌。没有什么重大的变化看似将要发生，不过如今澳大利亚财力雄厚，而美国自感囊中羞涩，或许过不了多久，美国就会要求澳洲人伸出援手，甚至有可能提议澳大利亚应当在诸如关岛等地与美国一道部署军力，正是在这些地区，山姆大叔可以表明谁才是太平洋上的老大。澳大利亚或许并不欢迎这种局面：它希望与两大强国都成为朋友。

　　The Aussies’ attitude to China remains tentative. Most Australians see relations as cordial—Ms Gillard made a successful visit to Beijing last month—but a poll for the Lowy Institute last month suggested almost half believe China will become a military threat within 20 years. Many worry about the extent of Chinese investment; although any proposal above a certain size is automatically reviewed by the authorities, the Lowy poll showed that 57% thought the government allowed too much of it. But Colin Barnett, the premier of Western Australia, where all resources seem magnetically drawn to China, is unconcerned. He says he welcomed 85 delegations from China last year and spends more time there than he does in Canberra.

　　澳洲人对于中国的态度依旧犹豫不决。在大部分澳大利亚人看来，澳中关系热情真诚——上个月，吉拉德对北京进行了一次成功的访问，不过罗维研究所(Lowy Institute)上月的一次民意调查却显示，将近半数的受访者相信中国将会在20年内成为一大军事威胁。许多人对于中国投资的幅度感到担忧：尽管任何超过一定规模的投资提案都将自动交由当局复审，但罗维调查依旧显示，有57%的受访者认为政府允许的中国投资过多。不过西澳大利亚州州长科林?巴尼特(Colin Barnett)对此却并没有放在心上，该州所有的资源似乎都像受到磁力吸引一般流向了中国。巴尼特表示，去年他迎接了85个来自中国的代表团，而他在中国待的时间比他在堪培拉的时间还要长。