2019年经济学人 美国的大规模干扰性武器(2)（在线收听）

You might think that America’s clout comes from its 11 aircraft-carriers, 6,500 nuclear warheads or its anchor role in the IMF. But it is also the central node in the network that underpins globalisation. This mesh of firms, ideas and standards reflects and magnifies American prowess. Though it includes goods traded through supply chains, it is mainly intangible. America controls or hosts over 50% of the world’s cross-border bandwidth, venture capital, phone-operating systems, top universities and fund-management assets. Some 88% of currency trades use greenbacks. Across the planet it is normal to use a Visa card, invoice exports in dollars, sleep beside a device with a Qualcomm chip, watch Netflix and work for a firm that BlackRock invests in.

你可能认为美国的影响力来自其11艘航空母舰、6500枚核弹头或其在国际货币基金组织中的核心角色。但美国也是支撑全球化网络的中心节点。这种由公司、理念和标准组成的网络反映并放大了美国的实力。虽然它包括通过供应链交易的商品，但主要是无形的。美国控制或拥有全球超过50%的跨境带宽、风险资本、电话操作系统、顶尖大学和基金管理资产。大约88%的外汇交易使用美元。在全球范围内，使用Visa卡、用美元开具出口发票、睡在装有高通芯片的设备旁、看Netflix，以及为贝莱德投资的公司工作，这些都稀松平常。

Foreigners accept all this because, on balance, it makes them better off. They may not set the rules of the game, but they get access to American markets and fair treatment alongside American firms. Globalisation and technology have made the network more powerful although America’s share of world GDP has fallen, from 38% in 1969 to 24% now. China cannot yet compete, even though its economy is approaching America’s in size. Despite this, Mr Trump and his advisers are convinced that the world order is rigged against America, pointing to its rustbelt and its trade deficit. And rather than mimic the relatively restrained tactics of the last trade conflict, with Japan in the 1980s, they have redefined how economic nationalism works.

外国人接受这一切，因为总的来说，这让他们生活得更好。他们可能不会制定游戏规则，但他们可以进入美国市场，并与美国公司一起获得公平待遇。尽管美国在全球GDP中所占的份额从1969年的38%下降到现在的24%，但是全球化和技术使美国全球化之网更加强大。尽管如此，特朗普和其顾问们认为，世界秩序受到了操纵，不利于美国，原因是美国经济衰退和贸易逆差。他们没有效仿上世纪80年代与日本贸易冲突中相对克制的策略，而是重新定义了经济民族主义的运作方式。