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(单词翻译:双击或拖选)
Bello
The more successful of Latin America's populists have become more pragmatic
ON THE night of October 12th, after comfortably winning a third term as the president of Bolivia, Evo Morales was in full rhetorical flow. Having dedicated3 his victory to Cuba's Fidel Castro and the late Hugo Chavez of Venezuela, he went on: “How much longer will we continue to be subjected to the North American empire or the capitalist system? This triumph is a triumph for anti-imperialists and anti-colonialists.”
So far, so reminiscent of 2007. That was when Chavez's anti-yanqui continental4 alliance, known as the Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas (ALBA), hit its zenith. It had gained two new recruits with the election of Rafael Correa in Ecuador and of Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua. Having won a new term by a 26-point margin5, Chavez pledged himself to “21st-century socialism”. A year earlier Mr Morales, a socialist6 coca-growers' leader of Amerindian descent, had won Bolivia's presidency7 proclaiming that he was “the United States's worst nightmare”. In Argentina the election in 2007 of Cristina Fernandez, an ALBA fellow-traveller, prolonged the regime of her husband and predecessor8, Nestor Kirchner.
Analysts9 lumped these leaders together as radical10 populists, for want of a better term. Yet despite a shared bent11 for autocracy12, there were always differences among them, not least because of their countries' differing circumstances. Seven years on, their fates are distinct. In Venezuela Chavez bequeathed a toxic13 economic legacy14 to his lacklustre successor, Nicolas Maduro. A country that claims the world's biggest oil reserves has been so badly mismanaged that it is scraping around for dollars. As for Ms Fernandez, having plunged15 Argentina into stagflation, she is down and almost out, despite her last-gasp effort to turn her argument over debt with a New York court into a nationalist epic16.
Their difficulties are in sharp contrast with Mr Morales's continuing popularity. True, he has been in power for a shorter period. But his success has recently owed less to “anti-capitalism” and much more to his accommodation with economic orthodoxy and local capitalists. After a turbulent early period when he pushed through a new constitution, quashed the opposition17 and nationalised foreign-owned oil and gas producers and utilities, he has presided over several years of political stability and economic growth. And he has made his peace with private business.
The ALBA presidents all claim to be leading durable18 “revolutions”, not just any old government. In practice, all of them (save Mr Ortega) built their popularity on recycling a huge increase in rents from the commodity boom into subsidies19 for the poor and expanded social provision. But Mr Morales has been much less wasteful20 than Chavez and the Kirchners, having run a fiscal21 surplus every year since 2005.
Mr Correa, like Mr Morales, is becoming more pragmatic. He has invested his oil windfall in roads, schools and hospitals. He recently negotiated a trade agreement with the European Union and has restored normal ties with the IMF. Last month he watered down a new banking22 law under which the state was to dictate23 the destination of private bank loans. As for Mr Ortega, who has long been chummy with private businessmen, his espousal of a quixotic, Chinese-backed and environmentally damaging scheme for a trans-Isthmian canal looks like a search for elusive24 rents to sustain his family's grip on power.
Mr Morales and Mr Correa, who won re-election last year, may be riding high now. But there are clouds on the horizon for their “revolutions”, too. Despite the rhetoric2, these do not include the United States: Barack Obama's response to ALBA has been to yawn. Their first problem is the end of the commodity boom. Three-quarters of Bolivia's exports are of natural gas or minerals, whose prices are falling. Ecuador invests much more than Bolivia. Mr Correa has boosted non-oil exports. He has done more than Mr Morales to try to diversify25 his country's economy, with so far uncertain results. But his “citizens' revolution” is showing signs of financial strain. Ecuador is heading for a fiscal deficit26 of up to 7% of GDP this year. And the oil price is crashing.
1 travails | |
n.艰苦劳动( travail的名词复数 );辛勤努力;痛苦;分娩的阵痛 | |
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2 rhetoric | |
n.修辞学,浮夸之言语 | |
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3 dedicated | |
adj.一心一意的;献身的;热诚的 | |
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4 continental | |
adj.大陆的,大陆性的,欧洲大陆的 | |
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5 margin | |
n.页边空白;差额;余地,余裕;边,边缘 | |
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6 socialist | |
n.社会主义者;adj.社会主义的 | |
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7 presidency | |
n.总统(校长,总经理)的职位(任期) | |
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8 predecessor | |
n.前辈,前任 | |
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9 analysts | |
分析家,化验员( analyst的名词复数 ) | |
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10 radical | |
n.激进份子,原子团,根号;adj.根本的,激进的,彻底的 | |
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11 bent | |
n.爱好,癖好;adj.弯的;决心的,一心的 | |
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12 autocracy | |
n.独裁政治,独裁政府 | |
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13 toxic | |
adj.有毒的,因中毒引起的 | |
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14 legacy | |
n.遗产,遗赠;先人(或过去)留下的东西 | |
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15 plunged | |
v.颠簸( plunge的过去式和过去分词 );暴跌;骤降;突降 | |
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16 epic | |
n.史诗,叙事诗;adj.史诗般的,壮丽的 | |
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17 opposition | |
n.反对,敌对 | |
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18 durable | |
adj.持久的,耐久的 | |
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19 subsidies | |
n.补贴,津贴,补助金( subsidy的名词复数 ) | |
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20 wasteful | |
adj.(造成)浪费的,挥霍的 | |
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21 fiscal | |
adj.财政的,会计的,国库的,国库岁入的 | |
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22 banking | |
n.银行业,银行学,金融业 | |
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23 dictate | |
v.口授;(使)听写;指令,指示,命令 | |
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24 elusive | |
adj.难以表达(捉摸)的;令人困惑的;逃避的 | |
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25 diversify | |
v.(使)不同,(使)变得多样化 | |
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26 deficit | |
n.亏空,亏损;赤字,逆差 | |
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