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(单词翻译:双击或拖选)
Charlemagne
Russia's friends in black
Why Europe's populists and radicals1 admire Vladimir Putin
IF EUROPE'S far-right parties do as well as many expect in May's European election,
no world leader will be happier than Vladimir Putin.
For a man who claims to be defending Russian-speakers in Ukraine against fascists2 and Nazis3,
the Russian president has some curious bedfellows on the fringes of European politics,
ranging from the creepy uniformed followers4 of Jobbik in Hungary to the more scrubbed-up National Front in France.
There was a time when Russia's friends were principally on the left.
There are still some pro-Moscow communists, for instance in Greece.
But these days the Kremlin's chums are most visible on the populist right.
The crisis in Ukraine has brought out their pro-Russian sympathies,
most overtly5 when a motley group of radicals was invited to vouch6 for Crimea's referendum on rejoining Russia.
The “observers” included members of the National Front, Jobbik, the Vlaams Belang in Belgium,
Austria's Freedom Party (FPO) and Italy's Northern League, as well as leftists from Greece and Germany and an assortment7 of eccentrics.
They declared that the ballot8, denounced by most Western governments as illegitimate, had been exemplary.
So what does Europe's far right see in Mr Putin? As nationalists of various stripes,
their sympathies might have lain with their Ukrainian fellows fighting to escape Russian influence.
In fact, argues Peter Kreko of Political Capital, a Hungarian think-tank,
beyond favourable9 treatment in Russian-sponsored media,
many are attracted by Mr Putin's muscular assertion of national interests,
his emphasis on Christian10 tradition, his opposition11 to homosexuality and the way he has brought vital economic sectors12 under state control.
For some, pan-Slavic ideas in eastern Europe play a role.
A common thread is that many on the far right share Mr Putin's hatred13 for an order dominated by America and the European Union.
For Mr Putin, support from the far right offers a second channel for influence in Europe.
The flirtation14 with Russia first became apparent in eastern Europe some years ago, despite memories of Soviet15 occupation.
Jobbik, which took 20% of the vote in Hungary's recent election,
denounced Russian riots in Estonia after the removal of a Soviet war memorial in 2007.
But a year later it backed Russia's military intervention16 in Georgia.
Far-right parties in Bulgaria and Slovakia also supported Russia.
Since then, Russian influence has become apparent in western Europe, too.
Marine17 Le Pen, leader of the National Front, has been given red-carpet treatment in Moscow and even visited Crimea last year.
At December's congress of Italy's Northern League, pro-Putin officials were applauded when they spoke18 of sharing
“common Christian European values”. Among those attending were three nascent19 allies:
Geert Wilders of the Netherlands' Party for Freedom, Heinz-Christian Strache of the FPO, and Ludovic de Danne, Ms Le Pen's European adviser20.
For Mr de Danne the parties share an aversion to the euro and, more widely, to the EU's federalist dream.
They oppose globalisation and favour protectionism.
They seek a “Europe of homelands”, stretching from Lisbon to Vladivostok.
As for Ukraine, he calls the revolution in Kiev “illegitimate” and says the referendum in Crimea was justified21 by the pro-Russian sentiment of the Crimean population.
By attaching themselves to the EU and America, Ukraine's new rulers expose their country to IMF oppression and the pillage22 of its natural resources.
Such dalliance with Mr Putin may create trouble for Mr Wilders,
who sees the EU as a monster but is a strong supporter of gay rights.
According to Mr de Danne, the Eurosceptic alliance has agreed to co-ordinate only on internal EU matters, not international affairs.
A degree of admiration23 for Mr Putin also stretches to Britain's UK Independence Party (UKIP).
It sees Ms Le Pen and Mr Wilders as too tainted24 by racism25 and is parting ways with the Northern League.
But UKIP's leader, Nigel Farage, while insisting he dislikes Mr Putin's methods,
thinks the Russian leader has skilfully26 wrong-footed America and Europe.
The EU, he declared in a televised debate, “has blood on its hands” for raising Ukraine's hopes of EU membership and provoking Mr Putin.
Mr Farage's critique is perhaps a way of attacking the EU's enlargement policy,
which is now linked by many to immigration. Yet it is also an implicit27 admission that the club remains28 attractive to those outside it.
Mr Putin is too clever to rely only on Europe's insurgent29 parties, successful as some may be.
So as well as cultivating anti-establishment groups, he has worked to entice30 national elites31.
While Jobbik advocates closer economic relations with the east, Hungary's Prime Minister, Viktor Orban, is already doing it.
A veteran of the struggle against communism, embodying32 the catchphrase “Goodbye, Comrade”,
Mr Orban recently signed a deal with Russia to expand a nuclear-power plant, financed by a 10 billion ($14 billion) Russian loan.
He has sought to weaken European sanctions against Russia. In Italy the Northern League's leader,
Matteo Salvini, may shout “viva the referendum in Crimea”, but Matteo Renzi, the centre-left prime minister,
has also been assiduous in resisting tough sanctions.
Anti-EU parties will no doubt become stronger and noisier,
but they lack the numbers and the cohesion33 fundamentally to change EU business in the European Parliament.
Their effect will be more subtle. They may force mainstream34 parties in the parliament into more backroom deals,
deepening the EU's democratic deficit35.
Their agitation36 is more likely to influence national politics and to push governments into more Eurosceptic positions.
And they will provide an echo chamber37 for Mr Putin, making it harder still for the Europeans to come up with a firm and united response to Mr Putin's military challenge to the post-war order in Europe.
There is more at stake in May than a protest vote.
1 radicals | |
n.激进分子( radical的名词复数 );根基;基本原理;[数学]根数 | |
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2 fascists | |
n.法西斯主义的支持者( fascist的名词复数 ) | |
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3 Nazis | |
n.(德国的)纳粹党员( Nazi的名词复数 );纳粹主义 | |
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4 followers | |
追随者( follower的名词复数 ); 用户; 契据的附面; 从动件 | |
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5 overtly | |
ad.公开地 | |
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6 vouch | |
v.担保;断定;n.被担保者 | |
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7 assortment | |
n.分类,各色俱备之物,聚集 | |
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8 ballot | |
n.(不记名)投票,投票总数,投票权;vi.投票 | |
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9 favourable | |
adj.赞成的,称赞的,有利的,良好的,顺利的 | |
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10 Christian | |
adj.基督教徒的;n.基督教徒 | |
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11 opposition | |
n.反对,敌对 | |
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12 sectors | |
n.部门( sector的名词复数 );领域;防御地区;扇形 | |
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13 hatred | |
n.憎恶,憎恨,仇恨 | |
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14 flirtation | |
n.调情,调戏,挑逗 | |
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15 Soviet | |
adj.苏联的,苏维埃的;n.苏维埃 | |
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16 intervention | |
n.介入,干涉,干预 | |
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17 marine | |
adj.海的;海生的;航海的;海事的;n.水兵 | |
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18 spoke | |
n.(车轮的)辐条;轮辐;破坏某人的计划;阻挠某人的行动 v.讲,谈(speak的过去式);说;演说;从某种观点来说 | |
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19 nascent | |
adj.初生的,发生中的 | |
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20 adviser | |
n.劝告者,顾问 | |
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21 justified | |
a.正当的,有理的 | |
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22 pillage | |
v.抢劫;掠夺;n.抢劫,掠夺;掠夺物 | |
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23 admiration | |
n.钦佩,赞美,羡慕 | |
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24 tainted | |
adj.腐坏的;污染的;沾污的;感染的v.使变质( taint的过去式和过去分词 );使污染;败坏;被污染,腐坏,败坏 | |
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25 racism | |
n.民族主义;种族歧视(意识) | |
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26 skilfully | |
adv. (美skillfully)熟练地 | |
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27 implicit | |
a.暗示的,含蓄的,不明晰的,绝对的 | |
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28 remains | |
n.剩余物,残留物;遗体,遗迹 | |
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29 insurgent | |
adj.叛乱的,起事的;n.叛乱分子 | |
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30 entice | |
v.诱骗,引诱,怂恿 | |
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31 elites | |
精华( elite的名词复数 ); 精锐; 上层集团; (统称)掌权人物 | |
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32 embodying | |
v.表现( embody的现在分词 );象征;包括;包含 | |
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33 cohesion | |
n.团结,凝结力 | |
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34 mainstream | |
n.(思想或行为的)主流;adj.主流的 | |
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35 deficit | |
n.亏空,亏损;赤字,逆差 | |
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36 agitation | |
n.搅动;搅拌;鼓动,煽动 | |
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37 chamber | |
n.房间,寝室;会议厅;议院;会所 | |
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