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(单词翻译:双击或拖选)
Chapter 1 - Rulers and generals are “history’s slaves”
From the close of the year 1811 intensified1 arming and concentrating of the forces of Western Europe began, and in 1812 these forces — millions of men, reckoning those transporting and feeding the army — moved from the west eastwards2 to the Russian frontier, toward which since 1811 Russian forces had been similarly drawn3. On the twelfth of June, 1812, the forces of Western Europe crossed the Russian frontier and war began, that is, an event took place opposed to human reason and to human nature. Millions of men perpetrated against one another such innumerable crimes, frauds, treacheries, thefts, forgeries4, issues of false money, burglaries, incendiarisms, and murders as in whole centuries are not recorded in the annals of all the law courts of the world, but which those who committed them did not at the time regard as being crimes.
What produced this extraordinary occurrence? What were its causes? The historians tell us with naive5 assurance that its causes were the wrongs inflicted6 on the Duke of Oldenburg, the nonobservance of the Continental7 System, the ambition of Napoleon, the firmness of Alexander, the mistakes of the diplomatists, and so on.
Consequently, it would only have been necessary for Metternich, Rumyantsev, or Talleyrand, between a levee and an evening party, to have taken proper pains and written a more adroit8 note, or for Napoleon to have written to Alexander: “My respected Brother, I consent to restore the duchy to the Duke of Oldenburg”— and there would have been no war.
We can understand that the matter seemed like that to contemporaries. It naturally seemed to Napoleon that the war was caused by England’s intrigues9 (as in fact he said on the island of St. Helena). It naturally seemed to members of the English Parliament that the cause of the war was Napoleon’s ambition; to the Duke of Oldenburg, that the cause of the war was the violence done to him; to businessmen that the cause of the way was the Continental System which was ruining Europe; to the generals and old soldiers that the chief reason for the war was the necessity of giving them employment; to the legitimists of that day that it was the need of re-establishing les bons principes, and to the diplomatists of that time that it all resulted from the fact that the alliance between Russia and Austria in 1809 had not been sufficiently10 well concealed11 from Napoleon, and from the awkward wording of Memorandum12 No. 178. It is natural that these and a countless13 and infinite quantity of other reasons, the number depending on the endless diversity of points of view, presented themselves to the men of that day; but to us, to posterity14 who view the thing that happened in all its magnitude and perceive its plain and terrible meaning, these causes seem insufficient15. To us it is incomprehensible that millions of Christian16 men killed and tortured each other either because Napoleon was ambitious or Alexander was firm, or because England’s policy was astute17 or the Duke of Oldenburg wronged. We cannot grasp what connection such circumstances have with the actual fact of slaughter18 and violence: why because the Duke was wronged, thousands of men from the other side of Europe killed and ruined the people of Smolensk and Moscow and were killed by them.
To us, their descendants, who are not historians and are not carried away by the process of research and can therefore regard the event with unclouded common sense, an incalculable number of causes present themselves. The deeper we delve19 in search of these causes the more of them we find; and each separate cause or whole series of causes appears to us equally valid20 in itself and equally false by its insignificance21 compared to the magnitude of the events, and by its impotence — apart from the cooperation of all the other coincident causes — to occasion the event. To us, the wish or objection of this or that French corporal to serve a second term appears as much a cause as Napoleon’s refusal to withdraw his troops beyond the Vistula and to restore the duchy of Oldenburg; for had he not wished to serve, and had a second, a third, and a thousandth corporal and private also refused, there would have been so many less men in Napoleon’s army and the war could not have occurred.
Had Napoleon not taken offense22 at the demand that he should withdraw beyond the Vistula, and not ordered his troops to advance, there would have been no war; but had all his sergeants23 objected to serving a second term then also there could have been no war. Nor could there have been a war had there been no English intrigues and no Duke of Oldenburg, and had Alexander not felt insulted, and had there not been an autocratic government in Russia, or a Revolution in France and a subsequent dictatorship and Empire, or all the things that produced the French Revolution, and so on. Without each of these causes nothing could have happened. So all these causes — myriads24 of causes — coincided to bring it about. And so there was no one cause for that occurrence, but it had to occur because it had to. Millions of men, renouncing25 their human feelings and reason, had to go from west to east to slay26 their fellows, just as some centuries previously27 hordes28 of men had come from the east to the west, slaying29 their fellows.
The actions of Napoleon and Alexander, on whose words the event seemed to hang, were as little voluntary as the actions of any soldier who was drawn into the campaign by lot or by conscription. This could not be otherwise, for in order that the will of Napoleon and Alexander (on whom the event seemed to depend) should be carried out, the concurrence30 of innumerable circumstances was needed without any one of which the event could not have taken place. It was necessary that millions of men in whose hands lay the real power — the soldiers who fired, or transported provisions and guns — should consent to carry out the will of these weak individuals, and should have been induced to do so by an infinite number of diverse and complex causes.
We are forced to fall back on fatalism as an explanation of irrational31 events (that is to say, events the reasonableness of which we do not understand). The more we try to explain such events in history reasonably, the more unreasonable32 and incomprehensible do they become to us.
Each man lives for himself, using his freedom to attain33 his personal aims, and feels with his whole being that he can now do or abstain34 from doing this or that action; but as soon as he has done it, that action performed at a certain moment in time becomes irrevocable and belongs to history, in which it has not a free but a predestined significance.
There are two sides to the life of every man, his individual life, which is the more free the more abstract its interests, and his elemental hive life in which he inevitably35 obeys laws laid down for him.
Man lives consciously for himself, but is an unconscious instrument in the attainment36 of the historic, universal, aims of humanity. A deed done is irrevocable, and its result coinciding in time with the actions of millions of other men assumes an historic significance. The higher a man stands on the social ladder, the more people he is connected with and the more power he has over others, the more evident is the predestination and inevitability37 of his every action.
“The king’s heart is in the hands of the Lord.”
A king is history’s slave.
History, that is, the unconscious, general, hive life of mankind, uses every moment of the life of kings as a tool for its own purposes.
Though Napoleon at that time, in 1812, was more convinced than ever that it depended on him, verser (ou ne pas verser) le sang de ses peuples - “To shed (or not to shed) the blood of his peoples”— as Alexander expressed it in the last letter he wrote him — he had never been so much in the grip of inevitable38 laws, which compelled him, while thinking that he was acting39 on his own volition40, to perform for the hive life — that is to say, for history — whatever had to be performed.
The people of the west moved eastwards to slay their fellow men, and by the law of coincidence thousands of minute causes fitted in and co-ordinated to produce that movement and war: reproaches for the nonobservance of the Continental System, the Duke of Oldenburg’s wrongs, the movement of troops into Prussia — undertaken (as it seemed to Napoleon) only for the purpose of securing an armed peace, the French Emperor’s love and habit of war coinciding with his people’s inclinations41, allurement42 by the grandeur43 of the preparations, and the expenditure44 on those preparations and the need of obtaining advantages to compensate45 for that expenditure, the intoxicating46 honors he received in Dresden, the diplomatic negotiations47 which, in the opinion of contemporaries, were carried on with a sincere desire to attain peace, but which only wounded the self-love of both sides, and millions of other causes that adapted themselves to the event that was happening or coincided with it.
When an apple has ripened48 and falls, why does it fall? Because of its attraction to the earth, because its stalk withers49, because it is dried by the sun, because it grows heavier, because the wind shakes it, or because the boy standing50 below wants to eat it?
Nothing is the cause. All this is only the coincidence of conditions in which all vital organic and elemental events occur. And the botanist51 who finds that the apple falls because the cellular52 tissue decays and so forth53 is equally right with the child who stands under the tree and says the apple fell because he wanted to eat it and prayed for it. Equally right or wrong is he who says that Napoleon went to Moscow because he wanted to, and perished because Alexander desired his destruction, and he who says that an undermined hill weighing a million tons fell because the last navvy struck it for the last time with his mattock. In historic events the so-called great men are labels giving names to events, and like labels they have but the smallest connection with the event itself.
点击收听单词发音
1 intensified | |
v.(使)增强, (使)加剧( intensify的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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2 eastwards | |
adj.向东方(的),朝东(的);n.向东的方向 | |
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3 drawn | |
v.拖,拉,拔出;adj.憔悴的,紧张的 | |
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4 forgeries | |
伪造( forgery的名词复数 ); 伪造的文件、签名等 | |
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5 naive | |
adj.幼稚的,轻信的;天真的 | |
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6 inflicted | |
把…强加给,使承受,遭受( inflict的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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7 continental | |
adj.大陆的,大陆性的,欧洲大陆的 | |
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8 adroit | |
adj.熟练的,灵巧的 | |
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9 intrigues | |
n.密谋策划( intrigue的名词复数 );神秘气氛;引人入胜的复杂情节v.搞阴谋诡计( intrigue的第三人称单数 );激起…的好奇心 | |
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10 sufficiently | |
adv.足够地,充分地 | |
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11 concealed | |
a.隐藏的,隐蔽的 | |
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12 memorandum | |
n.备忘录,便笺 | |
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13 countless | |
adj.无数的,多得不计其数的 | |
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14 posterity | |
n.后裔,子孙,后代 | |
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15 insufficient | |
adj.(for,of)不足的,不够的 | |
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16 Christian | |
adj.基督教徒的;n.基督教徒 | |
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17 astute | |
adj.机敏的,精明的 | |
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18 slaughter | |
n.屠杀,屠宰;vt.屠杀,宰杀 | |
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19 delve | |
v.深入探究,钻研 | |
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20 valid | |
adj.有确实根据的;有效的;正当的,合法的 | |
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21 insignificance | |
n.不重要;无价值;无意义 | |
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22 offense | |
n.犯规,违法行为;冒犯,得罪 | |
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23 sergeants | |
警官( sergeant的名词复数 ); (美国警察)警佐; (英国警察)巡佐; 陆军(或空军)中士 | |
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24 myriads | |
n.无数,极大数量( myriad的名词复数 ) | |
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25 renouncing | |
v.声明放弃( renounce的现在分词 );宣布放弃;宣布与…决裂;宣布摒弃 | |
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26 slay | |
v.杀死,宰杀,杀戮 | |
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27 previously | |
adv.以前,先前(地) | |
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28 hordes | |
n.移动着的一大群( horde的名词复数 );部落 | |
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29 slaying | |
杀戮。 | |
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30 concurrence | |
n.同意;并发 | |
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31 irrational | |
adj.无理性的,失去理性的 | |
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32 unreasonable | |
adj.不讲道理的,不合情理的,过度的 | |
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33 attain | |
vt.达到,获得,完成 | |
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34 abstain | |
v.自制,戒绝,弃权,避免 | |
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35 inevitably | |
adv.不可避免地;必然发生地 | |
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36 attainment | |
n.达到,到达;[常pl.]成就,造诣 | |
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37 inevitability | |
n.必然性 | |
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38 inevitable | |
adj.不可避免的,必然发生的 | |
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39 acting | |
n.演戏,行为,假装;adj.代理的,临时的,演出用的 | |
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40 volition | |
n.意志;决意 | |
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41 inclinations | |
倾向( inclination的名词复数 ); 倾斜; 爱好; 斜坡 | |
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42 allurement | |
n.诱惑物 | |
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43 grandeur | |
n.伟大,崇高,宏伟,庄严,豪华 | |
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44 expenditure | |
n.(时间、劳力、金钱等)支出;使用,消耗 | |
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45 compensate | |
vt.补偿,赔偿;酬报 vi.弥补;补偿;抵消 | |
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46 intoxicating | |
a. 醉人的,使人兴奋的 | |
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47 negotiations | |
协商( negotiation的名词复数 ); 谈判; 完成(难事); 通过 | |
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48 ripened | |
v.成熟,使熟( ripen的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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49 withers | |
马肩隆 | |
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50 standing | |
n.持续,地位;adj.永久的,不动的,直立的,不流动的 | |
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51 botanist | |
n.植物学家 | |
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52 cellular | |
adj.移动的;细胞的,由细胞组成的 | |
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53 forth | |
adv.向前;向外,往外 | |
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54 eternity | |
n.不朽,来世;永恒,无穷 | |
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