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(单词翻译:双击或拖选)
STEVE INSKEEP, HOST:
Two crashes of Boeing 737s leave behind a follow-up question - what took the airplane maker1 so long to acknowledge a problem? The aviation system depends on self-reporting. Regulators encourage companies to acknowledge problems, working to ensure they have incentive2 to keep their own business exceedingly safe. NPR's Daniella Cheslow reports on some incentives3 that seem to encourage Boeing to keep quiet.
DANIELLA CHESLOW, BYLINE4: When an Indonesian Lion Air jet plunged5 into the Java Sea on October 29, Boeing issued a statement extending our heartfelt sympathies to the families of the 189 victims. It said initial investigation6 showed the downed plane had faulty data from a sensor7. But Boeing also said the same plane flew with the same faulty sensor a day before, and a different crew managed to keep control. Jeffrey Sonnenfeld a professor at the Yale School of Management, says Boeing's response bordered on pointing a finger at pilots overseas.
JEFFREY SONNENFELD: There was a question as to whether or not the pilots followed the right routines initially8 and if they were properly trained.
CHESLOW: Boeing put out a bulletin on what to do in case of a faulty sensor. It did not mention that the sensor feeds automated9 flight control software called MCAS that was suspected of forcing the plane into a nosedive. The FAA certified10 the 737 MAX to fly without requiring pilots to train on or even to know about MCAS. And then it was business as usual. Orders kept pouring in for the 737 MAX, the fastest-selling jet in Boeing's history, until March 10, when a 737 MAX flown by Ethiopian Airlines crashed with 157 casualties.
Over the next two days, authorities from China to Europe grounded the plane. But in the U.S., Boeing CEO Dennis Muilenburg announced that it was developing an update to its MCAS software and that the FAA did not require any further action. And Muilenburg even called the White House to say there was no data to support grounding the planes. Erik Bernstein, vice11 president of California-based Bernstein Crisis Management.
ERIK BERNSTEIN: You don't want to say something that is then translated in a court of law as an admission of guilt12.
CHESLOW: Bernstein says he thinks Boeing maintained this stance for financial reasons.
BERNSTEIN: I would assume that they were selling those planes up to the day they got grounded or at least attempting to. They're keeping business partners and investors13 from being spooked.
CHESLOW: Boeing says it was not avoiding responsibility but rather waiting for the facts to emerge. Richard Levick, CEO of the LEVICK communications firm in D.C., says its response did not go over well.
RICHARD LEVICK: They weren't personal. They weren't empathetic. They were speaking like engineers, and they weren't very visible.
CHESLOW: On March 13, three days after the second crash, the U.S. did ground the planes, saying it had new information. And shortly after, Muilenburg recorded his first video message about the crash.
(SOUNDBITE OF ARCHIVED RECORDING)
DENNIS MUILENBURG: We're taking action to fully14 reassure15 airlines and their passengers of the safety of the 737 MAX.
CHESLOW: But he still tiptoed around what caused the crashes. The turning point was when Ethiopian authorities released a preliminary report on April 4. Transportation Minister Dagmawit Moges said the pilots had followed Boeing's directions.
(SOUNDBITE OF ARCHIVED RECORDING)
DAGMAWIT MOGES: The crew performed all the procedures repeatedly provided by the manufacturer but was not able to control the aircraft.
CHESLOW: This is where Muilenburg's public posture16 shifted. In a carefully worded message, he acknowledged that MCAS had added extra risk to the cockpit.
(SOUNDBITE OF ARCHIVED RECORDING)
MUILENBURG: It's our responsibility to eliminate this risk. We own it, and we know how to do it.
CHESLOW: We own it has since become a catchphrase for Boeing. Muilenburg repeated it last week when he spoke17 at the George W. Bush Presidential Center in Dallas.
(SOUNDBITE OF ARCHIVED RECORDING)
MUILENBURG: Frankly18, these last few weeks have been the most heart-wrenching of my career.
CHESLOW: It was a safe audience. Boeing has donated millions to the George W. Bush Institute, and Muilenburg didn't take questions. Bernstein says owning the problem was a first step toward connecting with the public.
BERNSTEIN: And I think that opens them up to really get a lot more compassionate19 with their communication.
CHESLOW: There is a downside. Houston attorney Nomi Husain is suing Boeing for negligence20 on behalf of a victim's family. He says Muilenburg's comments give his case ammunition21.
NOMI HUSAIN: This admission, I think, helps us clear the hurdle22 of negligence.
CHESLOW: Boeing must get its software fix and extra pilot training approved to get its planes back in the air. Once that's done, the new transparency will help convince passengers that the 737 MAX is safe to fly.
Daniella Cheslow, NPR News.
1 maker | |
n.制造者,制造商 | |
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2 incentive | |
n.刺激;动力;鼓励;诱因;动机 | |
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3 incentives | |
激励某人做某事的事物( incentive的名词复数 ); 刺激; 诱因; 动机 | |
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4 byline | |
n.署名;v.署名 | |
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5 plunged | |
v.颠簸( plunge的过去式和过去分词 );暴跌;骤降;突降 | |
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6 investigation | |
n.调查,调查研究 | |
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7 sensor | |
n.传感器,探测设备,感觉器(官) | |
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8 initially | |
adv.最初,开始 | |
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9 automated | |
a.自动化的 | |
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10 certified | |
a.经证明合格的;具有证明文件的 | |
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11 vice | |
n.坏事;恶习;[pl.]台钳,老虎钳;adj.副的 | |
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12 guilt | |
n.犯罪;内疚;过失,罪责 | |
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13 investors | |
n.投资者,出资者( investor的名词复数 ) | |
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14 fully | |
adv.完全地,全部地,彻底地;充分地 | |
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15 reassure | |
v.使放心,使消除疑虑 | |
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16 posture | |
n.姿势,姿态,心态,态度;v.作出某种姿势 | |
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17 spoke | |
n.(车轮的)辐条;轮辐;破坏某人的计划;阻挠某人的行动 v.讲,谈(speak的过去式);说;演说;从某种观点来说 | |
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18 frankly | |
adv.坦白地,直率地;坦率地说 | |
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19 compassionate | |
adj.有同情心的,表示同情的 | |
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20 negligence | |
n.疏忽,玩忽,粗心大意 | |
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21 ammunition | |
n.军火,弹药 | |
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22 hurdle | |
n.跳栏,栏架;障碍,困难;vi.进行跨栏赛 | |
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