China's youth can get a bad press. In most accounts, they are the "Little Emperors" or the "Me Generation", the spoilt and apolitical offspring of one-child families who are interested in fast cars, video games and designer goods but little else. At the main Shanghai store of Louis Vuitton there is a queue to get in at weekends – young women wait patiently in the rope line, as if they were trying to get into the hottest new LA club.
中国的年轻人是媒体苛责的对象。在大多数报道中，他们是“小皇帝”，或者是“自我的一代”，这些娇生惯养、不问政治的独生子女只关心跑车、电脑游戏和名家设计的商品。在上海的路易威登店，周末等待进店消费的年轻顾客耐心排起了队。
Yet the Me Generation is beginning to show its teeth. Simmering discontent about soaring house prices and the recent wave of strikes at car plants and other factories both speak of the rising and sometimes frustrated expectations of younger Chinese, who want more from their lives than their parents could dream of. It is a phenomenon that could have all sorts of consequences for China's future.
不过“自我的一代”正开始发威。从长期以来对房价猛涨怀有的不满以及最近汽车制造厂和其他工厂出现的罢工潮可以看出，中国年轻人的期望值在不断提高，但又经常受挫。和父辈相比，他们希望从生活中得到更多东西。这种现象可能会对中国的未来产生各种各样的影响。
There are lots of good explanations for the strikes of the past two months, including low pay and a demographic shift that is reducing the number of young people entering the workforce. But there is also a generational shift at play. Chinese often talk about their capacity to chi ku, or "eat bitterness", which helps explain their resilience amid the chaos and privations of the past century. But the generation born in the 1980s and 1990s has grown up among much wider prosperity, even in poor parts of the countryside.
近两个月来出现的罢工事件有很多原因，比如工资太低，以及人口结构发生改变，进厂做工的年轻人数量减少。但是这代人身上发生的变化也是一个因素。中国人经 常说自己能“吃苦”， 这让他们能够适应最近一百年的混乱与贫困。但是上世纪八九十年代出生的这代人，成长的环境要好得多，哪怕是在落后的农村地区。
Twenty years ago, the main goal of many migrant workers in city factories was to send money home to struggling village families. Now they see the factory as part of a personal project, a first step towards an urban life. Internet access has made them worldlier and since a labor law passed in 2008 they have a stronger sense of their rights.
20年前，许多到城里工厂打工的外来务工人员一心想着给家里寄钱，供养农村的家人。现在的年轻人把工厂视为个人事业的一部分，是他们走向城市生活的第一步。互联网开拓了他们的视野，外来务工人员也有了强烈的维权意识。
The economist Andy Xie said, "Today's young adults and their parents may as well be from different centuries. They want to settle down in big cities and have interesting, well-paying jobs – just like their counterparts in other countries."经济学家谢国忠说：“今天的青年和上一代好像来自不同的世纪。他们想在大城市定居；和其他国家的同龄人一样，他们期待从事有趣、高薪的工作。”
For the tens of millions of young Chinese graduates, buying a flat is a central part of their plan to live a modern, middle-class life. Young Chinese men feel the social pressure the most.
对于数千万中国年轻人来说，买套房子是他们人生计划的核心内容，这样他们才能过上中产阶级的生活。中国年轻人能够最深切体会到社会的压力。
The same generational forces have been behind the discontent over the cost of housing. There have been no mass demonstrations about property prices but the tensions are real enough.
对高房价的不满情绪的背后，也是这样的力量。房价没有引起大规模示威活动，但紧张气氛是切实存在的。
It is the young who are hit most by rising prices. Many young Chinese now feel priced out. Beijing and other cities have thousands of what Chinese media call the "ant tribe", young graduates who live in precarious housing on the outskirts as they try to land their first job.
受房价飙升影响最大的就是年轻人。许多年轻人现在感觉根本买不起房子。北京和其他城市有成千上万住在郊区危房、寻觅人生第一份工作的大学毕业生，中国媒体称他们为“蚁族”。
On the recent occasions when young Chinese have expressed strong political opinions, nationalism has been the dominant tone. Yet it is not a contradiction for young people to be more patriotic, but also more demanding and individualistic. Modernization has unleashed powerful forces – pride and confidence in China's achievements but also high expectations about the life that can be lived. The signs of restlessness among young Chinese make for a less predictable political future.
最近，中国年轻人表达了鲜明的政治观点，民族主义是主导的论调。不过，年轻人一方面更加爱国，另一方面提出的要求更多、更加个人主义、这两者并不矛盾。现代化释放了强大的力量：既有对中国取得的成就的自豪与自信，也有对未来生活的高期望值。 |