关于中国与菲律宾南海较量：你只需要知道一件事情

Manila can sue Beijing all it wants, but in the end it seemsChinese leaders already know how they will respond. . .

菲律宾可以随意的控告中国，但是中国政府已经决定如何回应…..

In just a few weeks the Permanent Court of Arbitration in TheHague will render its verdict in a case filed by the Philippines to challengeChina’s longstanding maritime claims in the South China Sea. While the resultof that arbitration remains unknown, Beijing has already telegraphed how itwill react should the court rule in Manila’s favor.

过不了几个周，海牙法庭关于菲律宾提交的起诉中国关于南海主张的仲裁结果即将出炉。虽然结果还未知，但是中国已经表明自己将会采取什么样的措施，如果仲裁结果有利于菲律宾。

For months now, Chinese officials have made Beijing’s casefor rejecting the tribunal’s legal authority in the matter while characterizingManila’s gambit as “irresponsibly frivolous.” The Chinese foreign ministry hasalready questioned the court’s authority and is boycotting the entire process,which it has derided as an “orchestrated performance.” As legal scholar JeromeCohen noted in a recent article, both the Chinese Society ofInternational Law and the All China Lawyers Association have issued “dutifulsupporting arguments” in favor of snubbing the process.

最近几个月内，中国官员依照北京指示拒绝承认海牙法庭的法律权威，并且指责菲律宾的控诉是极不负责行为。中国外交部已经质疑并且抵制整个过程，并嘲笑其为精心策划的闹剧。正如法学专家科恩在其文章里提到的，为了阻止该仲裁过程，所有中国的国际和国内法律协会都对该仲裁案提出了质疑，

More important to understanding Beijing’s mind-set on thematter is the fact that even if the court had had the authority to rule in thecase and the powers to enforce its decision, it is highly unlikely that Beijingwould have been any more inclined to accede. The reason behind this is directlyrelated to the historical narrative of “national humiliation” and the beliefthat as a product of Western imperialism, global institutions and the legalarchitecture of international law are little more than mechanisms to maintain askewed distribution of power. In other words, a ruling by an internationalcourt against Beijing would have provided more “evidence” that the West, alongwith its allies in East Asia, are conspiring to keep China in a state ofsubjugation. As Zheng Wang demonstrates in his book Never Forget National Humiliation, the victimization narrative wields a powerfulinfluence on decisionmaking in Beijing and public support for its doggedresponse to the perceived affront. A survey conducted in 2013 by Andrew Chubbalso shows that 83 percent of Chinese respondents regarded the South China Seadispute as a continuation of theso-called “century of humiliation.”

在这件事上我们需要清楚的了解中国的想法，因为即使海牙法庭有权利进行仲裁和有能力执行仲裁结果，中国也不可能接受仲裁结果。在仲裁案背后，中国有着很强烈的历史观“国家耻辱”，并且坚信现有的国际法律体系只不过是西方帝国主义和国际组织为了维持权利平衡而设立的机制。也就是说，如果国际法庭作出不利于中国的裁决，那么更加证明西方国家及其盟友东亚国家正在合谋压制中国。正如郑旺在其书《永不忘记的国家耻辱》中所提现的，受害者心态影响着北京的决定，并且促使公众强烈支持对抵抗外来冒犯有。安德鲁丘博在2013年做的调研表明83%的中国民众认为南海争端是中国世纪耻辱的延续。

Having attained a certain level of respectability ininternational relations, Beijing is no longer a “status quo” power. Ittherefore has less compunction in seeking to undermine or reconfigure globalinstitutions when it sees fit, to “reorder the world” so as to better align thesystem with the new norms created by China’s reemergence as a majorcivilizational power.

除了在一定程度上尊重国际关系，中国已经不是“维持现状”的力量。因此在北京认为合适的时候，将会毫无内疚的破坏或者重新构造国际组织，以此来更好的适应中国再次崛起为一个主要的文明力量下的新常态体系。

The fate of the Permanent Court of Arbitration’s ruling isalready sealed. Appealing to international law may have been a good idea onpaper, but from the outset it had no chance of having any impact on thedispute.

南海仲裁案的结局已经注定，通过国际法来解决问题只是纸上谈兵，国际法从来就不会对南海争议产生影响。