美国和欧洲的政策制定者都错判了全球经济的困境。

　　It is not a short-run, cyclical problem curable with textbook Keynesian stimuli (and exotics like quantitative easing). Rather, it is a long-term structural disequilibrium caused by chronic trade imbalances — the result, in turn, of manipulated currencies, mercantilist practices and poorly negotiated trade deals.

　　它并非一个通过教科书般的凯恩斯式经济刺激（以及量化宽松等不寻常举措）就能解决的短期周期性问题，而是一个因长期贸易失衡导致的长期结构性失衡，而长期贸易失衡是汇率操纵、重商主义惯例和谈判糟糕的贸易协议的结果。

　　Enter, stage centre, Donald Trump.

　　唐纳德?特朗普(Donald Trump)站到了舞台中央。

　　Before the era of globalisation, which began in earnest in the 1980s, US managers improved efficiency by substituting capital for labour in domestic factories.

　　在全球化（真正开始是在上世纪80年代）时代开启之前，美国企业管理者通过在国内工厂用资本取代劳动力提高了效率。

　　As globalisation has taken hold, executives have offshored entire factories as a more effective means of maximising profits.

　　随着全球化的推进，作为一种更有效的利润最大化方式，企业高管们将整个工厂外包到海外。

　　This offshoring trend is mirrored in statistics that reveal a rapid narrowing of the US manufacturing sector.

　　这种外包趋势在数据统计中得到了体现。数据显示，美国制造业快速收缩。

　　In the 1970s, manufacturing employed 20 per cent of the workforce.

　　上世纪70年代，美国制造业聘用了全国20%的劳动者。

　　Today, that number has dropped to a mere 8 per cent — with more than 5m manufacturing jobs lost since 2000 alone.

　　如今，这一数字降至区区8%，仅自2000年以来制造业就损失了500万个以上的就业岗位。

　　To those who would blame this decline primarily on automation, one need only point to Germany and Japan, which retain almost 20 per cent and 17 per cent of their labour force in manufacturing, respectively.

　　对于那些将这种收缩主要归咎于自动化的人，我们只需让他们看看德国和日本，这两国分别将近20%和17%的劳动者留在了制造业

　　These countries are worldwide leaders in robotics.

　　，而这两个国家是机器人领域的全球领袖。

　　As the US manufacturing base has narrowed, the rate of productivity has fallen.

　　随着美国制造业基础的收缩，生产率一直下滑。

　　During the 1970s growth in US unit labour costs was 6.8 per cent a year but it dropped to 3.6 per cent in the 1980s, 1.6 per cent in the 1990s and to 1.2 per cent so far this century.

　　上世纪70年代，美国的单位劳动成本每年增长6.8%，80年代降至3.6%，90年代降至1.6%，本世纪至今为1.2%。

　　This productivity decline is likewise mirrored in the rise of outward foreign direct investment.

　　生产率下滑反映在了对外直接投资(FDI)增长上。

　　During the 1970s, total US FDI was a mere $109.2bn.

　　上世纪70年代，美国的对外直接投资只有1092亿美元。

　　With globalisation, FDI grew 59.2 per cent to $174.8bn in the 1980s, $1.1tn in the 1990s and $3tn in the first decade of this century.

　　上世纪80年代，在全球化的推动下，美国的对外直接投资增长59.2%，至1748亿美元，上世纪90年代和本世纪头10年分别达到1.1万亿美元和3万亿美元。

　　Today, FDI is sprinting ahead at a $4tn rate.

　　如今，对外直接投资正以4万亿美元的速度向前挺进。

　　Of course, not all outbound FDI has been due to offshoring.

　　当然，并非所有对外直接投资都是因为外包。

　　The decline in US manufacturing employment and the fall in US productivity — and associated slower US growth rates and stagnant wages — have, however, been greatly accelerated and amplified by a series of bad trade deals and chronic currency misalignments that prevent trade from coming back into balance.

　　一系列的糟糕贸易协议和长期汇率失调阻止贸易恢复平衡，加快并放大了美国制造业就业的减少以及美国生产率的下滑——还有相关的美国经济增速放缓和薪资停滞。

　　This is hardly the conventional wisdom — whence the continued tilting at Keynesian windmills in both the US and Europe.

　　这很难说是传统观点。欧美的传统观点都继续倾向凯恩斯式的刺激。

　　New studies have, however, cast increasing doubt on the standard gains from trade arguments that have both justified and propelled globalisation.

　　然而，新研究越来越让人质疑标准的贸易利得说法，这种说法既合理化又推动了全球化。

　　A joint study by Justin Pierce of the Federal Reserve and Yale School of Management’s Peter Schott attributes most of the 18 per cent decline in US manufacturing jobs from 2001 to 2007 to President Bill Clinton’s decision to grant China permanent normal trade relations status as part of Beijing’s accession to theWorld Trade Organisation in 2001.

　　美联储(Fed)的贾斯汀?皮尔斯(Justin Pierce)和耶鲁大学管理学院(Yale School of Management)的彼得?斯科特(Peter Schott)联合开展的研究，将2001年至2007年美国制造业就业减少18%的多数原因归为美国前总统比尔?克林顿(Bill Clinton)的一项决定：作为中国在2001年加入世界贸易组织(WTO)的一部分，美国赋予了中国永久性正常贸易关系待遇。

　　Other studies have concluded the China trade shock to be more of a zero-sum game, with American workers and the US economy on the minus side.

　　其他一些研究总结称，中国贸易冲击更多的是一种零和游戏，美国劳动者和美国经济处于不利地位。

　　The broader lesson here is that while exports do indeed create jobs, it is net exports that ultimately matter.

　　更广泛的教训是尽管出口确实会创造就业，但最终重要的是净出口。

　　When countries like the US and continents like Europe run massive and chronic trade deficits and countries like China do not allow freely floating currency movements to balance trade, bad things will eventually happen in the forms of accelerated offshoring, slower growth, falling productivity and stagnant wages.

　　如果美国等国和欧洲等大陆长期处于大规模贸易赤字，而中国等国不允许汇率自由浮动以平衡贸易，那么糟糕的结果最终会以外包加快、增长放缓、生产率下滑以及薪资停滞的形式出现。

　　This is the economic and political landscape that the US now finds itself in, and it is no wonder that Mr Trump is so popular.

　　这是美国现在所处的经济和政治情况，特朗普如此受欢迎也就不足为奇了。

　　Like Ronald Reagan in the 1980s, the Republican nominee understands America’s economic woes can only be addressed through comprehensive structural reforms, particularly in the areas of trade and tax policy.

　　与上世纪80年代的罗纳德?里根(Ronald Reagan)一样，这位共和党总统提名人选明白，美国的经济困境只能通过全面结构性改革化解，尤其是在贸易和税收政策领域。

　　For example, America’s 35 per cent corporate tax rate means businesses carry down only 65 per cent of pre-tax earnings to their post-tax net.

　　例如，美国35%的企业税税率意味着，企业只能将65%的税前利润计入税后利润。

　　Mr Trump’s proposed 15 per cent rate promises a 30 per cent higher earnings return than at present, and would thereby greatly improve the attractiveness of domestic investment.

　　特朗普提议的15%的企业税税率意味着企业利润将比目前提高30%，这将大大提高国内投资的吸引力。

　　Mr Trump’s broader mission is to reinvigorate the US economy and restore faith in the global free trade order by ridding it of cheating and structural misalignments.

　　特朗普的更广泛任务是通过消除欺诈和结构性失调，恢复美国经济的活力并重塑人们对全球自由贸易秩序的信任。

　　Europe may want to take a page out of his playbook.

　　欧洲可能会希望向他取经。

　　This is particularly true when it comes to China.

　　在涉及到中国的问题上尤其如此。

　　Here, Europe has lagged behind the US in imposing countervailing tariffs against dumping, and is now paying a very heavy price.

　　在征收反倾销关税方面，欧洲一直落后于美国，而且现在正付出非常沉重的代价。