2020年经济学人 公司税——数位落差(2)（在线收听）

The talks cover two proposals, or "pillars", in OECD-speak.

谈判涵盖两项提议，或用OECD的话来说是两个“支柱”。

The first is meant to direct more of the global-tax take towards places where the customers of digital firms live.

第一个的目标是将更多的全球税收导向数字公司的客户所在的地区。

Corporate-tax liability will depend not on whether companies are physically present in a country,

企业纳税责任将不取决于公司是否实际存在于某个国家，

but on whether they have a "sustained and significant involvement" there. Pillar two establishes a global minimum tax.

而是取决于他们在该国是否存在“持续或重大的参与”。支柱二是建立全球最低税。

The OECD reckons that the two proposals could together raise corporate-tax revenue by up to 4%.

OECD认为这两项提议可以共同将企业税收增加4%。

Pillar two has the greater chance of being agreed—and would raise more revenue.

第二项支柱更有可能达成一致，并且会增加更多的收入。

The idea of a global minimum is to blunt companies' incentives to shift profits to low-tax jurisdictions. There is still some haggling to be done.

全球最低税的想法，是为了削弱企业将利润转移到低税收司法管辖区的动机。还有一些需要进行争论的地方。

But some sort of agreement should be possible, if only because governments can go it alone.

要是政府能够单独行动，那么达成某种协议还是有可能的。

The Americans, for example, enacted a version in 2017, with a tax on global intangible low-taxed income (GILTI).

例如，美国在2017年通过一个版本，对全球无形资产低税收入（GILTI）征税。

Havens can offer all the perks they want, but American companies still face a rate of at least 10.5% on GILTI associated with their foreign affiliates.

避税地可以提供他们想要的所有特权，但美国公司仍要面临与外国子公司相关的至少10.5%的GILTI税率。

That might explain why Steven Mnuchin, America's treasury secretary, was reasonably positive about the second pillar last month.

这或许能够解释为什么美国财政部长史蒂文·姆努钦上月对第二个支柱持相当积极的态度。

But he wants to put talks on the first on hold. In December he proposed that the new system should be optional for American firms.

但他希望暂停第一轮谈判。12月，他提议，新体系应该成为美国公司的选择之一。

The suggestion, which would in effect neuter any new rules, was badly received by other countries.

其他国家对该项提议反应不佳（该建议将使任何新规则失效）。

But as it stands, the OECD's plan is unbalanced: it asks America to hand over the right to tax its companies to other countries, without getting much in return.

但现在看来，OECD的计划是不公正的：它要求美国把向本国公司征税的权力移交给其他国家，还得不到什么回报。

Without an agreement on pillar one that divvies up tax rights, a proliferation of digital-tax schemes seems likely.

如果不能对分摊征税权力的第一支柱达成协议，那么数字税方案的扩增似乎是有可能的。

(The European Union's resolve to implement one may have been stiffened by its loss on July 15th of a big tax case against Apple.)

（7月15日，欧盟在一桩针对苹果公司的重大税务案件中败诉，这可能加大了欧盟实施这一法案的决心。）

These taxes are a much cruder fix than a pillar-one solution. Companies could face a stack of competing tax bills.

这些是比支柱一解决方案更加粗暴的方法。公司可能会面临一大堆相互竞争的税单。

The levies also mostly apply to revenues rather than profits, and often try to exempt domestic champions. To top it all off, they are a recipe for trade conflict.

征税也主要针对收入而非利润，而且往往会试图免除国内冠军企业的税收。最重要的是，它们会引发贸易冲突。