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(单词翻译:双击或拖选)
By Kurt Achin
Seoul
23 December 2006
Despite a push for a diplomatic breakthrough at the end of 2006, the effort to keep North Korea out of the nuclear weapons club not only did not succeed - it lost ground. In October, the North defied international warnings and conducted its first nuclear test. Despite the resulting international sanctions, an emboldened1 Pyongyang says it will hold on to its nuclear weapons until its demands are fulfilled. VOA Seoul correspondent Kurt Achin takes a look back at year in which, some security experts say, the world became a slightly more dangerous place.
2006 drew to a close very much in the same way it began: with the United States and its partners demanding Pyongyang take steps to get out of the business of making nuclear weapons - and with Pyongyang saying no.
Despite a week of arduous2 diplomacy3 in Beijing in December, participants in the six-nation nuclear talks announced no concrete steps toward getting North Korea to live up to its denuclearization promises.
Christopher Hill
Chief U.S. delegate, Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill, said the talks were going into recess4, and might resume within weeks.
"Of course we're disappointed that we weren't able to get this done. But as I said let's see what we can do," he said.
Over the past three years, the United States, Russia, China, Japan, and South Korea have promised the impoverished5 North economic and diplomatic benefits, if it ends its nuclear programs.
Despite having pledged in principle in September 2005 to start dismantling6 its nuclear facilities, Pyongyang maintained throughout 2006 it would not move toward keeping the promise until the United States lifts financial measures against it. Washington says the sanctions are meant to stop North Korean money laundering7 and counterfeiting8.
Pyongyang stuck to that demand during the December session of the six-party talks and avoided all discussion on disarming9.
The North Koreans opened the talks by declaring their country a nuclear power, and issuing a robust10 list of demands - a sign, regional experts say, that they feel emboldened by a line they crossed on October 9.
That is when Pyongyang proudly announced it had conducted an underground test of a nuclear weapon.
Kim Taewoo, senior analyst11 at Seoul's Korea Institute for Defense12 Analyses, says that single blast rewrote the whole security equation for North Asia.
He says the test made it justifiable13 for other Asian countries, like Japan, to consider developing nuclear arsenals14. At the same time, attempts to contain the spread of nuclear weapons around the world were severely15 weakened. He adds that the fragile diplomatic and military balance between North and South Korea was also distorted.
After the nuclear test, the United Nations Security Council responded quickly - unanimously passing economic sanctions against the North. Even China, Pyongyang's longtime ally, voted for the sanctions.
The political reverberations in South Korea, still technically16 at war with the North since the 1950s, were immediate17.
Lawmakers in South Korea angrily grilled18 officials in the administration of South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun about his policy of engagement with North Korea.
South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun speaks during a nationally televised press conference at the President House in Seoul, South Korea, Wednesday, Jan. 25, 2006
President Roh, seeking to build on a historic North-South summit in 2000, favors an uncritical and financially generous approach toward the North. The so-called Sunshine policy is meant to encourage North Korea to open up and end its isolation19.
But with the nuclear test, critics around the world, and even Mr. Roh, questioned whether Pyongyang was living up to its side of the bargain.
In an October speech, Mr. Roh announced the policy would need some "adjustments", although he did not abandon engagement.
Most experts in South Korea and elsewhere say seeking engagement is preferable to the risks of tension and conflict on the peninsula. The debate is between those who say the policy needs to demand more reciprocity from the North, and those who say uncritical patience will pay off in the long run.
Lee Jang-hie, president of the South Korean branch of the International Law Association, supports that view, and says the United States deserves some blame for the stalled nuclear talks.
He says North Korea has no choice but to hang on to its nuclear negotiation20 card, because the United States will not guarantee the North's regime security.
The United States, on the other hand, thinks that Mr. Roh's policy and aid from both South Korea and China have encouraged Pyongyang's pursuit of nuclear weapons. The U.S. government has urged both Beijing and Seoul to thoroughly21 enforce the U.N. sanctions limiting shipments of weapons materials and luxury goods to North Korea - something both governments have been hesitant about.
Some regional security experts think there is little that will persuade North Korea to give up its nuclear programs. Even tougher sanctions, which could cut off some of the international aid Pyongyang has relied on for a decade to feed its people, may have no effect.
Park Yung-ho, of Seoul's Korea Institute for National Unification, thinks the North has no choice but to hang on to its nuclear weapons - because they are the only remaining semblance22 of power and legitimacy23 for the failed dynasty of the ruling Kim family.
Park says the only way out of the nuclear problem is for North Korea's system to transform dramatically.
However, Kim Sung-han, an analyst with Seoul's government-supported Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security, say there are some reasons for hope in the nuclear discussions as 2007 dawns.
He says 2007 leads up to key political events in three of the countries in the six-party talks. China will be making final preparations for the 2008 Olympics; the United States will be heading into its 2008 presidential election; and South Korea votes in December for a new president. All three events increase the pressure to resolve the nuclear issue.
If the talks fail to progress, and North Korea deepens its commitment to nuclear weapons, Washington and other countries have warned, it will become more estranged24 from the rest of the world. As a result, the North's already severe economic hardships may only get worse.
1 emboldened | |
v.鼓励,使有胆量( embolden的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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2 arduous | |
adj.艰苦的,费力的,陡峭的 | |
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3 diplomacy | |
n.外交;外交手腕,交际手腕 | |
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4 recess | |
n.短期休息,壁凹(墙上装架子,柜子等凹处) | |
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5 impoverished | |
adj.穷困的,无力的,用尽了的v.使(某人)贫穷( impoverish的过去式和过去分词 );使(某物)贫瘠或恶化 | |
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6 dismantling | |
(枪支)分解 | |
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7 laundering | |
n.洗涤(衣等),洗烫(衣等);洗(钱)v.洗(衣服等),洗烫(衣服等)( launder的现在分词 );洗(黑钱)(把非法收入改头换面,变为貌似合法的收入) | |
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8 counterfeiting | |
n.伪造v.仿制,造假( counterfeit的现在分词 ) | |
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9 disarming | |
adj.消除敌意的,使人消气的v.裁军( disarm的现在分词 );使息怒 | |
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10 robust | |
adj.强壮的,强健的,粗野的,需要体力的,浓的 | |
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11 analyst | |
n.分析家,化验员;心理分析学家 | |
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12 defense | |
n.防御,保卫;[pl.]防务工事;辩护,答辩 | |
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13 justifiable | |
adj.有理由的,无可非议的 | |
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14 arsenals | |
n.兵工厂,军火库( arsenal的名词复数 );任何事物的集成 | |
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15 severely | |
adv.严格地;严厉地;非常恶劣地 | |
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16 technically | |
adv.专门地,技术上地 | |
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17 immediate | |
adj.立即的;直接的,最接近的;紧靠的 | |
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18 grilled | |
adj. 烤的, 炙过的, 有格子的 动词grill的过去式和过去分词形式 | |
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19 isolation | |
n.隔离,孤立,分解,分离 | |
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20 negotiation | |
n.谈判,协商 | |
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21 thoroughly | |
adv.完全地,彻底地,十足地 | |
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22 semblance | |
n.外貌,外表 | |
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23 legitimacy | |
n.合法,正当 | |
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24 estranged | |
adj.疏远的,分离的 | |
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