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(单词翻译:双击或拖选)
By Gary Thomas and John Shields
Washington, D.C.
20 February 2006
watch Intelligence report
One of the puzzling questions hanging over the Iraq war is: how did the intelligence turn out to be so wrong? Critics of the Iraq policy have charged that intelligence was manipulated by Bush administration officials to win public support for going to war. It is a charge that is vehemently1 denied by the administration. As VOA correspondent Gary Thomas reports, a former intelligence insider has reignited that debate.
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Paul Pillar
For 28 years, Paul Pillar labored2 deep within the Central Intelligence Agency, eventually rising to become National Intelligence Officer for the Near East and South Asia. But, upon retiring recently from the CIA, he did something intelligence officers generally shy away from -- he went public.
In an article for the highly respected journal Foreign Affairs, he alleged3 the Bush administration had selectively chosen bits of intelligence -- "cherry-picking," in intelligence parlance4 -- to justify5 its already made decision to go to war.
The article has set off a firestorm, as the administration has repeatedly and vehemently denied manipulating intelligence. Late last year, Vice6 President Dick Cheney said this: "What is not legitimate7, and what I will again say is dishonest and reprehensible8, is the suggestion by some U.S. senators that the president of the United States or any member of his administration purposely misled the American people on prewar intelligence."
The intelligence failure on Iraq -- weapons of mass destruction that the administration insisted Saddam Hussein had turned out not to exist -- acutely embarrassed the intelligence community. Intelligence officers have insisted that they did not "cook" or distort the intelligence to satisfy the administration.
In a VOA interview, Paul Pillar says administration officials wanted to demonstrate some substantive9 link between Saddam Hussein's regime and al-Qaida, when in fact, he says, no such links existed.
"The main thing that happened there, particularly with reference to this issue of, was there a relationship between the Saddam regime and al-Qaida -- was a selective use of bits and pieces of reporting to try to build the case that in this case there was some kind of alliance without really reflecting the analytic10 judgment11 of the intelligence community that there was not."
Then-Secretary of State Colin Powell at the UN in 2003 presenting evidence of Iraq's war powers
In his U.N. presentation in 2003, Secretary Powell spoke12 of alleged contacts between Iraq and al-Qaida.
"Some believe, some claim these contacts do not amount to much,” said Mr. Powell. “They say Saddam Hussein's secular13 tyranny and al-Qaida's religious tyranny do not mix. I am not comforted by this thought. Ambition and hatred14 are enough to bring Iraq and al-Qaida together, enough so al-Qaida could learn how to build more sophisticated bombs and learn how to forge documents, and enough so that al-Qaida could turn to Iraq for help in acquiring expertise15 on weapons of mass destruction."
In a speech at the American Enterprise Institute late last year, Vice President Cheney again strongly denied the intelligence had been manipulated and that any suggestion that it was a lie.
Paul Pillar says while there was no direct pressure to alter intelligence analyses on Iraq, he argues that the administration's determination to go to war created a climate that choked off objectivity and squelched16 dissenting17 views among intelligence analysts19.
"If, instead, the analyst18 is operating in an environment in which he knows decisions have already been made, in which he knows the policymaker has a particular preference for what would suit his purposes in mustering20 support for that decision -- well, that's an entirely21 different sort of thing.” Mr. Pillar told us. “And it certainly reduces any inclination22 analysts may have to challenge a conventional wisdom or a consensus23 judgment, as we had on Iraqi W.M.D."
Pillar says he doesn't want to rehash the past, but provoke a debate on how to fix relations between the intelligence community and policy makers24 before the next major crisis.
"What I have in mind is looking forward and having a relationship between two parts of our government that is sound enough and healthy enough and proper enough that the next time a very difficult, sticky issue comes up like Iraq, that we will see that relationship work well."
Even now, debate is underway about the nature and extent of Iran's nuclear program. It is a debate, says Paul Pillar, that could benefit from the missteps on the road to war in Iraq.
1 vehemently | |
adv. 热烈地 | |
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2 labored | |
adj.吃力的,谨慎的v.努力争取(for)( labor的过去式和过去分词 );苦干;详细分析;(指引擎)缓慢而困难地运转 | |
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3 alleged | |
a.被指控的,嫌疑的 | |
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4 parlance | |
n.说法;语调 | |
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5 justify | |
vt.证明…正当(或有理),为…辩护 | |
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6 vice | |
n.坏事;恶习;[pl.]台钳,老虎钳;adj.副的 | |
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7 legitimate | |
adj.合法的,合理的,合乎逻辑的;v.使合法 | |
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8 reprehensible | |
adj.该受责备的 | |
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9 substantive | |
adj.表示实在的;本质的、实质性的;独立的;n.实词,实名词;独立存在的实体 | |
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10 analytic | |
adj.分析的,用分析方法的 | |
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11 judgment | |
n.审判;判断力,识别力,看法,意见 | |
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12 spoke | |
n.(车轮的)辐条;轮辐;破坏某人的计划;阻挠某人的行动 v.讲,谈(speak的过去式);说;演说;从某种观点来说 | |
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13 secular | |
n.牧师,凡人;adj.世俗的,现世的,不朽的 | |
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14 hatred | |
n.憎恶,憎恨,仇恨 | |
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15 expertise | |
n.专门知识(或技能等),专长 | |
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16 squelched | |
v.发吧唧声,发扑哧声( squelch的过去式和过去分词 );制止;压制;遏制 | |
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17 dissenting | |
adj.不同意的 | |
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18 analyst | |
n.分析家,化验员;心理分析学家 | |
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19 analysts | |
分析家,化验员( analyst的名词复数 ) | |
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20 mustering | |
v.集合,召集,集结(尤指部队)( muster的现在分词 );(自他人处)搜集某事物;聚集;激发 | |
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21 entirely | |
ad.全部地,完整地;完全地,彻底地 | |
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22 inclination | |
n.倾斜;点头;弯腰;斜坡;倾度;倾向;爱好 | |
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23 consensus | |
n.(意见等的)一致,一致同意,共识 | |
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24 makers | |
n.制造者,制造商(maker的复数形式) | |
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