经济学人35:狡猾的迪克和美元

 　　Finance and Economics；Economics focus; Tricky¹ Dick and the dollar

　　财经；经济焦点; 狡猾的迪克和美元;

　　Does Richard Nixon have anything to teach Barack Obama about economic diplomacy²?

　　在经济外交上，尼克松真的有可以教奥巴马的吗?

　　THE “Nixon shock” is not the name given to President Richard Nixon's resignation in 1974 amid the Watergate scandal, his bombing of Cambodia during the Vietnam war or his audacious visit to communist China. It refers instead to a bundle of economic policies unveiled to an unsuspecting world on August 15th 1971. The president imposed a freeze on wages and prices for 90 days to break inflation, ended the convertibility³ of dollars into gold, and slapped a “surcharge” or tariff⁴ of 10% on imports.

　　“尼克松冲击”不是在说美国故总统尼克松在1974年为水门事件而下台，也不是在说他在越战期间对柬埔寨大肆轰炸，更不是在说他大胆的造访了共产中国。这词是在说他在1971年8月15日毫无预警的对世界宣布了一套经济政策。这位总统为了遏止通胀，将薪资成长和物价冻结了九十天，终结了美元和黄金可以用一定比例互换的制度(金汇兑本位制)，也对进口货物扣上了10%的”附加税”。

　　Nixon is not usually a source of inspiration for left-leaning pundits⁵ such as Paul Krugman of the New York Times. But like 130 congressmen, who this month signed a letter to Timothy Geithner, America's treasury⁶ secretary, he is calling on the White House to emulate⁷ Nixon and impose a “surcharge” on imports from China. The tariff is supposed to force China to strengthen its currency, the yuan, against the dollar, just as Nixon's surcharge prompted America's trading partners to renegotiate their exchange rates four months later.

　　左倾的评论家如纽约时报的保罗˙克鲁曼，通常是不会把尼克松当作是惕励的对象。但是这个月，他连同一百三十位众议员签暑了一封信给美国的财政部长提摩西˙盖特纳(Timothy Geithner)，信中呼吁白宫要仿效尼克松对中国进口物品课征”附加税”。这个进口税的用意是要逼使中国让人民币对美元升值，正如当年尼克松的”附加税”逼使美国的贸易伙伴在四个月后重新议定汇率。

　　Mr Krugman argues that China's weak yuan is costing America roughly 1.4m jobs. Its cheap currency gives its exporters an edge in the American marketplace. China then squirrels its dollar earnings⁸ away in American securities rather than spending them on American goods. In normal circumstances these asset purchases would lower interest rates, boosting American borrowing and spending. But America, like other rich countries, is now caught in a “liquidity trap”. Interest rates are as low as they can go. By saving dollars rather than spending them, China is draining demand from the world economy.

　　克鲁曼先生主张，中国被低估的人民币，让美国失去了将近一百四十万个工作。低估的汇率给了中国出口商在美国市场上的优势。然后中国像松鼠般把钱投资到美国证券上存起来，而不是用来买美国的商品。在正常情况下，对美国资产的投资会降低利率，因而提升美国人的借贷和消费。但是美国现在，和其他富有国家一样，也陷入了所谓的”流动性陷阱”。利率已经降无可降。中国将美元存起而不消费的行为，正消耗着世界的需求。

　　China's foreign-exchange reserves now total $2.4 trillion, of which about 70% are thought to be in dollars. In 1971 the central banks of America's trading partners had amassed⁹ a rather smaller hoard¹⁰, of about $40 billion. But that was enough to buy the gold in Fort Knox three times over, if America upheld its commitment to sell the metal at $35 an ounce. Britain's request to exchange dollars for gold on August 13th 1971 was the last straw. “Although the US government attached no great importance to the gold as such, a run on this gold would have been a sorry spectacle,” wrote George Shultz and Kenneth Dam, two prominent economic officials in the Nixon administration, in their book “Economic Policy Beyond the Headlines”. On August 15th Nixon, in effect, announced that America was now unwilling¹¹ to do what it would soon be incapable¹² of doing—converting dollars into gold at the agreed exchange rate.

　　中国的外汇存底现在总计达2.4万亿美元，其中大约70%是存成美元。在1971年时，美国贸易伙伴的央行累积的美元不多，大约只有四百亿美元。可是如果美国信守当时美元和黄金的兑换率，35美元兑一盎司黄金，这些美元已然足够可以买下三倍诺克斯堡(Fort Knox)库存的所有的黄金(译注: 美国储备的黄金大多存放在诺克斯堡)。英国在1971年8月13日要求将其持有美元兑换黄金是压倒骆驼的最后一根稻草。两位尼克松幕僚的重要经济官员，乔治˙舒尔茨(George Shultz)和肯尼˙丹(Kenneth Dam)，在他们的书”头条背后的经济政策(Economic Policy Beyond the Headlines)”中说，”虽然美国政府不认为黄金非常重要，但是如果发生黄金挤兑却也实在难看”。在8月15日，尼克松实际上宣布了美国政府不愿意履行其即将没有能力履行的事--将美元按既定的汇率兑换黄金。

　　Messrs Shultz and Dam argue that the import surcharge was intended as “an attention-getter and a bargaining chip”. It allowed John Connally, Nixon's treasury secretary and a Texan, to stride down the corridors of international finance “with both guns blazing”. In the face of this bravado¹³ America's trading partners duly backed down. By December they agreed to let the dollar fall (by a trade-weighted average of 6.5%) and the surcharge was removed. Nixon was able to present the humbling¹⁴ of the dollar as a political victory. But were Barack Obama to emulate him, would he really enjoy the same result?

　　舒尔茨先生和丹先生认为进口的附加税是刻意用来做为”注意唤醒剂和谈判筹码”。好让尼克松那位德州人的财政部长约翰˙康纳利(John Connally)，走在国际金融的大街上，”手持双枪亮晃”。在这样的威吓下，美国的贸易伙伴们全都乖乖就范。十二月不到，他们就同意让美元贬值(幅度约是交易额加权平均数的6.5%)，附加税也跟着取消。尼克松当时将美元的贬值宣传成政治上的胜利。不过如果奥巴马如法泡制，他会真的赢得同样的结果吗?

　　The obvious difference is that in 1971 America was locked into a system of fixed¹⁵ parities¹⁶. By pegging¹⁸ to the dollar, a currency was automatically fixed to everything else. Since July 2008 China has pegged¹⁹ the yuan to the greenback. But over that period its currency has swung up and down against those of its trading partners and competitors. On a trade-weighted basis the yuan is back to where it was when the financial crisis started. Indeed, compared with China's emerging-market competitors in its big export markets, the yuan is about 12% more expensive today than it was before the collapse²⁰ of Lehman Brothers, according to a measure (the “third-country” effective exchange rate) calculated by the Hong Kong Monetary²¹ Authority. By this indicator²² China's currency is about 25% above its level in 2005.

　　今昔最明显的差别是，在1971年时，美国和其他国家的货币是采用固定汇率制。任何一个货币，只要对美元挂钩，就会自动的与其他货币挂钩。自2008年7月以来，中国维持人民币与美元挂钩。但是，在同一段时间里，人民币与其贸易伙伴和竞争者的货币，在汇率上却有着上下的摆荡。以交易额加权平均数为基准来看，人民币的币值和金融危机开始时相差不多。根据香港主管货币机构编纂的一个指数(“第三国家”实际汇率)，中国比起其出口上竞争的新兴国家，确实在币值上比雷曼兄弟倒闭时升值了12%。这个指数也指出，中国的货币比2005年的水平要升值了25%。

　　The second difference is related to the first. Because everybody was pegged to the dollar in 1971, everybody had to pay the surcharge. Nixon dismayed everyone but discriminated²³ against no one. China's critics today, on the other hand, urge Mr Obama to slap a tariff on Chinese goods alone. This will reduce the demand for Chinese imports, which constitute about 15% of America's total. But there is no guarantee that customers will switch from Chinese goods to American ones instead. They are more likely to buy from China's rivals in Asia. The surcharge may change the composition of America's trade deficit²⁴, without necessarily changing its size.

　　第二个差别和第一个有关。在1971年时，所有的货币都和美元挂钩，所以所有的国家都必须被课附加税。尼克松让所有的国家都沮丧，但却没对任何一个国家有差别待遇。今天批评中国的人，却催促奥巴马先生单独对中国商品扣上附加税。虽然这将减少对目前占美国总进口15%的中国进口品的需求。却不保证消费者会转而购买美国的产品。更可能的是，他们会对中国在亚洲的竞争者下单。附加税只会改变美国贸易赤字的组成比例，而不见得能改变其规模。

　　Nixon goes to China

　　尼克松造访中国

　　The Nixon shock holds lessons for China as well as Mr Obama. Like China today, Germany in the 1960s disavowed any responsibility for the world's imbalances, insisting that the solution lay with tighter policies in deficit countries rather than looser policies in surplus countries. (Germany is still singing a version of that song.) But by holding fast to the dollar, Germany ended up importing America's laxity. It could not insulate itself from the loose monetary policy engineered to help Nixon win the 1972 election. German prices rose by over 5% in 1971. China, too, risks a loss of macroeconomic control if it continues to peg¹⁷ to the dollar. Its money supply grew by about 35% in the year to February. That kind of surge may be a precursor²⁵ to inflation.

　　尼克松的冲击，对中国以及奥巴马来说，都有借镜之处。正如今日的中国，1960年代的德国，也是拒绝承认对世界的贸易失衡有任何关系，并坚持解决之道在于贸易逆差国要紧缩，而不是贸易顺差国要放宽。可是经由对美元的挂钩，德国最终进口到美国货币上的宽松。尼克松为了赢得1972年选举，泡制了宽松的货币政策，而德国无法置身其外。德国物价在1971年上升了超过5%。如果人民币继续和美元挂钩，中国也同样冒着宏观经济失控的风险。该国货币供给在到二月份截止的年度里成长了35%。这种飙升也许是通胀的前兆。

　　The advocates of a surcharge argue that China will not act unless it is forced to do so. They point to defensive²⁶ remarks by Wen Jiabao, China's prime minister, arguing that the yuan was not undervalued and would remain “basically stable”. But the demise²⁷ of the Bretton Woods system suggests that official statements can be a poor guide to future policy. The decision not to revalue is “final, unequivocal and for eternity”. That's not a Chinese official in 2010, but a German official in the Nixon era—just five months before the Deutschmark was revalued by 9.3%.

　　附加税的鼓吹者主张，中国必须要有人施压才会行动。他们指出中国的总理温家宝仍做着防卫性的评论，说人民币并没被低估，也将会维持”基本上稳定”。但是布雷顿森林体系(Bretton Woods)的废弃，说明着官方说词通常不代表未来政策的走向。德国官方在尼克松时代说，我们决定不升值，而这决定是”不会改变、毫不含糊、直到永久”。这听起来像是中国官方的说法。在五个月后，德国马克升值了9.3%。

1 tricky   

adj.狡猾的，奸诈的；(工作等)棘手的，微妙的

参考例句：

• I'm in a rather tricky position.Can you help me out?我的处境很棘手，你能帮我吗？
• He avoided this tricky question and talked in generalities.他回避了这个非常微妙的问题，只做了个笼统的表述。

2 diplomacy   

n.外交；外交手腕，交际手腕

参考例句：

• The talks have now gone into a stage of quiet diplomacy.会谈现在已经进入了“温和外交”阶段。
• This was done through the skill in diplomacy. 这是通过外交手腕才做到的。

3 convertibility   

n.可改变性，可变化性；兑换

参考例句：

• Some countermeasure and recommendation on RMB's full convertibility. " 对人民币实现完全自由兑换提出了对策和建议。 来自互联网
• China capital convertibility's course is the same as foreign exchange system reform. 中国资本项目开放的进程，是与我国外汇体制改革的步伐相一致的。 来自互联网

4 tariff   

n.关税，税率；(旅馆、饭店等)价目表，收费表

参考例句：

• There is a very high tariff on jewelry.宝石类的关税率很高。
• The government is going to lower the tariff on importing cars.政府打算降低进口汽车的关税。

5 pundits   

n.某一学科的权威，专家( pundit的名词复数 )

参考例句：

• The pundits disagree on the best way of dealing with the problem. 如何妥善处理这一问题，专家众说纷纭。 来自辞典例句
• That did not stop Chinese pundits from making a fuss over it. 这并没有阻止中国的博学之士对此大惊小怪。 来自互联网

6 treasury   

n.宝库；国库，金库；文库

参考例句：

• The Treasury was opposed in principle to the proposals.财政部原则上反对这些提案。
• This book is a treasury of useful information.这本书是有价值的信息宝库。

7 emulate   

v.努力赶上或超越，与…竞争；效仿

参考例句：

• You must work hard to emulate your sister.你必须努力工作，赶上你姐姐。
• You must look at the film and try to emulate his behavior.你们必须观看这部电影，并尽力模仿他的动作。

8 earnings   

n.工资收人；利润，利益，所得

参考例句：

• That old man lives on the earnings of his daughter.那个老人靠他女儿的收入维持生活。
• Last year there was a 20% decrease in his earnings.去年他的收入减少了20%。

9 amassed   

v.积累，积聚( amass的过去式和过去分词 )

参考例句：

• He amassed a fortune from silver mining. 他靠开采银矿积累了一笔财富。
• They have amassed a fortune in just a few years. 他们在几年的时间里就聚集了一笔财富。 来自《简明英汉词典》

10 hoard   

n./v.窖藏，贮存，囤积

参考例句：

• They have a hoard of food in the basement.地下室里有他们贮藏的食物。
• How many curios do you hoard in your study?你在你书房里聚藏了多少古玩？

11 unwilling   

adj.不情愿的

参考例句：

• The natives were unwilling to be bent by colonial power.土著居民不愿受殖民势力的摆布。
• His tightfisted employer was unwilling to give him a raise.他那吝啬的雇主不肯给他加薪。

12 incapable   

adj.无能力的，不能做某事的

参考例句：

• He would be incapable of committing such a cruel deed.他不会做出这么残忍的事。
• Computers are incapable of creative thought.计算机不会创造性地思维。

13 bravado   

n.虚张声势，故作勇敢，逞能

参考例句：

• Their behaviour was just sheer bravado. 他们的行为完全是虚张声势。
• He flourished the weapon in an attempt at bravado. 他挥舞武器意在虚张声势。

14 humbling   

adj.令人羞辱的v.使谦恭( humble的现在分词 )；轻松打败（尤指强大的对手）；低声下气

参考例句：

• A certain humbling from time to time is good. 不时受点儿屈辱是有好处的。 来自辞典例句
• It has been said that astronomy is a humbling and character-buildingexperience. 据说天文学是一种令人产生自卑、塑造人格的科学。 来自互联网

15 fixed   

adj.固定的，不变的，准备好的；(计算机)固定的

参考例句：

• Have you two fixed on a date for the wedding yet?你们俩选定婚期了吗？
• Once the aim is fixed,we should not change it arbitrarily.目标一旦确定，我们就不应该随意改变。

16 parities   

同等( parity的名词复数 )； 相等； 对等； 奇偶校验

参考例句：

• A system where no official parities for currencies are declared or maintained. 指一种官方不公开汇率目标的汇率制度。
• In 2000 developing countries accounted for 37% of world output (at purchasing power parities). 2000年时，发展中国家只占全世界经济产出的37%（以消费力平价计算）。

17 peg   

n.木栓，木钉；vt.用木钉钉，用短桩固定

参考例句：

• Hang your overcoat on the peg in the hall.把你的大衣挂在门厅的挂衣钩上。
• He hit the peg mightily on the top with a mallet.他用木槌猛敲木栓顶。

18 pegging   

n.外汇钉住，固定证券价格v.用夹子或钉子固定( peg的现在分词 )；使固定在某水平

参考例句：

• To write a novel,one must keep pegging away at it consistently. 要写小说，必须不断辛勤劳动。 来自《简明英汉词典》
• She was pegging the clothes out on the line to dry. 她正在把衣服夹在晒衣绳上晾干。 来自辞典例句

19 pegged   

v.用夹子或钉子固定( peg的过去式和过去分词 )；使固定在某水平

参考例句：

• They pegged their tent down. 他们钉好了账篷。 来自《简明英汉词典》
• She pegged down the stairs. 她急忙下楼。 来自《现代英汉综合大词典》

20 collapse   

vi.累倒；昏倒；倒塌；塌陷

参考例句：

• The country's economy is on the verge of collapse.国家的经济已到了崩溃的边缘。
• The engineer made a complete diagnosis of the bridge's collapse.工程师对桥的倒塌做了一次彻底的调查分析。

21 monetary   

adj.货币的，钱的；通货的；金融的；财政的

参考例句：

• The monetary system of some countries used to be based on gold.过去有些国家的货币制度是金本位制的。
• Education in the wilderness is not a matter of monetary means.荒凉地区的教育不是钱财问题。

22 indicator   

n.指标；指示物，指示者；指示器

参考例句：

• Gold prices are often seen as an indicator of inflation.黃金价格常常被看作是通货膨胀的指标。
• His left-hand indicator is flashing.他左手边的转向灯正在闪亮。

23 discriminated   

分别，辨别，区分( discriminate的过去式和过去分词 )； 歧视，有差别地对待

参考例句：

• His great size discriminated him from his followers. 他的宽广身材使他不同于他的部下。
• Should be a person that has second liver virus discriminated against? 一个患有乙肝病毒的人是不是就应该被人歧视？

24 deficit   

n.亏空，亏损；赤字，逆差

参考例句：

• The directors have reported a deficit of 2.5 million dollars.董事们报告赤字为250万美元。
• We have a great deficit this year.我们今年有很大亏损。

25 precursor   

n.先驱者；前辈；前任；预兆；先兆

参考例句：

• Error is often the precursor of what is correct.错误常常是正确的先导。
• He said that the deal should not be seen as a precursor to a merger.他说该笔交易不应该被看作是合并的前兆。

26 defensive   

adj.防御的；防卫的；防守的

参考例句：

• Their questions about the money put her on the defensive.他们问到钱的问题，使她警觉起来。
• The Government hastily organized defensive measures against the raids.政府急忙布置了防卫措施抵御空袭。

27 demise   

n.死亡；v.让渡，遗赠，转让

参考例句：

• He praised the union's aims but predicted its early demise.他赞扬协会的目标，但预期这一协会很快会消亡。
• The war brought about the industry's sudden demise.战争道致这个行业就这么突然垮了。