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(单词翻译:双击或拖选)
To grasp what's going on at the Russia-Ukraine border, it helps to know some history
For a historical view on the Ukraine crisis, NPR's Leila Fadel talks to Mary Elise Sarotte, professor of history at Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies.
LEILA FADEL, HOST:
To really grasp what's going on at the border of Russia and Ukraine, it helps to know some history. We've called on Mary Elise Sarotte. She's a professor of history at Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies. Her latest book is "Not One Inch: America, Russia, And The Making Of Post-Cold War Stalemate." Thanks for being on the program, Mary Elise.
MARY ELISE SAROTTE: Thank you so much.
FADEL: So let's go back in time. The Soviet2 Union falls. There's this moment of opportunity for the U.S.-Russia relationship. Ukraine becomes an independent state. Take us back to that time.
SAROTTE: Yes. As President Bill Clinton said in the early 1990s, it was the first chance ever since the rise of the nation-state to have the entire continent of Europe live in peace. But the big question mark was - what would happen to the Soviet strategic nuclear arsenal3? What would happen after the collapse4 of centralized control and command? And Ukraine was particularly important because due to the amount of former Soviet arsenal on its territory, once it became independent, Ukraine was born nuclear. It was born the third-biggest nuclear power in the world.
FADEL: Right. So that's the reason that Ukraine becomes so strategic and the West wants to bring Ukraine into their sphere of influence.
SAROTTE: Yes, that and the fact that Ukraine is a large country. At that point, it had more than 50 million inhabitants. It was becoming a democracy. It's clearly a major European country. So you want to define a place for it in post-Cold War Europe.
FADEL: So what becomes of this moment of opportunity?
SAROTTE: As a historian, I know that Cold Wars are not short-lived affairs.
FADEL: Right.
SAROTTE: So thaws6 are precious. It's clear in hindsight that neither Russia nor the West took full advantage of the thaw5 that followed the collapse of the Soviet Union. The Russian president, Boris Yeltsin, despite initial hopes that he could smoothly7 democratize Russia and transform its economy into a thriving market economy, instead he runs into a series of enormous obstacles, and he allows corruption8 to flourish. And this causes the West, then, to gradually doubt that Russia really is transforming into a good neighbor, and it becomes fuel for those who want to pursue a harder line against Russia. And gradually, that leads, in cumulative9 interaction, to a deterioration10 of the newfound cooperation.
FADEL: And what does that look like, going from opportunity to hardening?
SAROTTE: Well, one of the big open questions is the question of NATO enlargement.
FADEL: Right.
SAROTTE: And initially11, in the early 1990s, President Clinton says, you know, having just erased12 the Cold War line across Europe, why should we draw a new line across Europe, not least because that would leave the post-Soviet states in the lurch13 above all Ukraine? He understood back in the 1990s that Ukraine was, as he put it, the linchpin of peace in Europe.
FADEL: So let's move ahead to the late 1990s.
SAROTTE: Yes.
FADEL: The fall of Boris Yeltsin; the rise of Vladimir Putin. And Ukraine holds a special importance for Putin. Can you explain why?
SAROTTE: Yes. There are both identity reasons and strategic reasons for that. Putin feels strongly that Russia and Ukraine are one indivisible nation; they should never have become separate states.
FADEL: Something many Ukrainians would argue is not true.
SAROTTE: Absolutely. He also has this concern about Ukraine becoming a member of NATO. We tend to think in the West of the collapse of the Soviet Union as an event, but I think it would help us to understand the significance of Ukraine if we think of Soviet collapse not as an event but as a process that is still ongoing14. So if you think of it that way, then you see that the 1999 war in Chechnya, the 2008 invasion in Georgia, the 2014 annexation15 of Crimea and what's going on now are all part of a long ongoing battle to define the limits of a shrunken Soviet empire.
FADEL: Let's go to 2014. I think a lot of Americans remember Russia's annexation of Crimea, and Ukrainians talk about not an invasion in this moment but long-term conflict that many of them have been living with since that annexation. What was Putin's calculus16 there?
SAROTTE: He was reacting to clear signs that Ukraine was moving toward the West. In 2008, the NATO Bucharest summit declaration stated that not only Ukraine but also Georgia would become members of NATO. That was one of the things that had prompted Putin to launch military action against Georgia in 2008. And in 2014, as Ukraine was also showing interest in the European Union, he decided17 to violate what everyone had assumed had become a fundamental tenet of post-Cold War order, namely a prohibition18 on changing borders in Europe through the use of force.
FADEL: And in Putin's telling, the U.S., the West, are breaking a promise by looking at Ukraine as a possible NATO member, right?
SAROTTE: Yes, there's two controversies19. There's a 1990 controversy20 over whether the West promised Moscow NATO would never move eastward21, not one inch eastward...
FADEL: Of Germany.
SAROTTE: Right, exactly. That's the 1990 controversy. Putin is obsessed22 with that, but he is also obsessed with the year 1997, when Boris Yeltsin belatedly tried to get what Mikhail Gorbachev didn't get, which was a veto over NATO expansion any further - so into Central and Eastern Europe. Boris Yeltsin did not get that in 1997, but he just said that he had anyway, thus creating a whole bunch of confusion. And so now Putin is instrumentalizing this sense of betrayal from both 1990 and 1997 to whip up emotions today, even though that's not consistent with the historical evidence.
FADEL: And so now we're here - 2022, Russian troops surrounding Ukraine right now. What might a diplomatic solution look like?
SAROTTE: NATO is not going to add Ukraine as a member. NATO is not going to put intermediate-range nuclear forces in Ukraine. NATO is not going to invade Russia. So somehow NATO and the West and Washington need to make all of that clear to Putin. And one way to do that would be to revive Cold War arms control treaties that we desperately23 need again - in particular, the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty from which Trump24 withdrew in 2019 and something called the Conventional Forces in Europe treaty. I think if we can make clear that reviving those would be both in our interest and Moscow's interest, there may still be hope, and it may be possible to prevent Ukrainians from dying in large numbers.
FADEL: Mary Elise Sarotte. She's a professor of history at Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies. Thank you so much.
SAROTTE: Thank you.
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1 transcript | |
n.抄本,誊本,副本,肄业证书 | |
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2 Soviet | |
adj.苏联的,苏维埃的;n.苏维埃 | |
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3 arsenal | |
n.兵工厂,军械库 | |
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4 collapse | |
vi.累倒;昏倒;倒塌;塌陷 | |
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5 thaw | |
v.(使)融化,(使)变得友善;n.融化,缓和 | |
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6 thaws | |
n.(足以解冻的)暖和天气( thaw的名词复数 );(敌对国家之间)关系缓和v.(气候)解冻( thaw的第三人称单数 );(态度、感情等)缓和;(冰、雪及冷冻食物)溶化;软化 | |
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7 smoothly | |
adv.平滑地,顺利地,流利地,流畅地 | |
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8 corruption | |
n.腐败,堕落,贪污 | |
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9 cumulative | |
adj.累积的,渐增的 | |
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10 deterioration | |
n.退化;恶化;变坏 | |
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11 initially | |
adv.最初,开始 | |
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12 erased | |
v.擦掉( erase的过去式和过去分词 );抹去;清除 | |
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13 lurch | |
n.突然向前或旁边倒;v.蹒跚而行 | |
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14 ongoing | |
adj.进行中的,前进的 | |
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15 annexation | |
n.吞并,合并 | |
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16 calculus | |
n.微积分;结石 | |
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17 decided | |
adj.决定了的,坚决的;明显的,明确的 | |
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18 prohibition | |
n.禁止;禁令,禁律 | |
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19 controversies | |
争论 | |
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20 controversy | |
n.争论,辩论,争吵 | |
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21 eastward | |
adv.向东;adj.向东的;n.东方,东部 | |
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22 obsessed | |
adj.心神不宁的,鬼迷心窍的,沉迷的 | |
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23 desperately | |
adv.极度渴望地,绝望地,孤注一掷地 | |
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24 trump | |
n.王牌,法宝;v.打出王牌,吹喇叭 | |
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